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Abstract 
This thesis examines the problems of gender relations and nation in post-Soviet 
Ukraine and aims to engender the Ukrainian nation building project. This project 
claims to be in the interest of all Ukrainian citizens, but is in fact profoundly 
gendered. Women and men have different gender roles, however it is typically men 
who are in control of the nation building project, and therefore of defining national 
gender norms. Central to male Ukrainian nation builders' conception of the 
''Ukrainian woman" is the ancient Slav pagan goddess Berehynia. Berehynia is 
represented as an ancient figure, the protectress of Ukrainian traditions and values 
since ancient times. Her image is used to promote the cult of the mother and child, 
the home and hearth, and thus to shape the desires and ambitions of contemporary 
Ukrainian women. The cult of Berehynia first became popular after the publication 
of Berehynia in 1987 by Ukrainian ethnographer Vasyl Skurativskyi. The Berehynia 
legend is legitimized by its antiquity and is promoted as a model for Ukrainian 
women to follow. 
Typically, both gender and women's issues are absent from discussion about 
contemporary Ukrainian transitions. While Ukraine is actively engaged in the 
project of nation building and various large-scale transitions, women are assumed 
to be less、、丨mportant" and their questions and problems are subordinated to the 
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more��u rgen t� task of nation building. However, letters to the editor, articles in 
magazines and newspapers, and journalists' interviews, all illustrate the deeply 
gendered nature of the national project. In fact, such subordination of women's 
issues to those of the nation has its precedent in the nineteenth century when 
nationalism and feminism first encountered one another. Female activists in Galicia 
believed that women could not be liberated if the nation had not first been liberated. 
Today, the long-awaited goal has been achieved and Ukraine is an independent 
country. Nonetheless, the goal is being redefined. Women are now told that 
building a modern Ukrainian nation requires not only further sacrifices from women, 
but also their cooperation. Berehynia is an excellent example of this, and helps 
illuminate the ways in which women are urged to contribute to the nation building 
project. Indeed, the Berehynia cult serves the nation-building project in three ways. 
First, it reconstructs and promotes��proper� gender roles for women, which are 
primarily mother and wife. Second, it inhibits women's quest for rights by asserting 
that Ukrainian women have always been empowered and by appealing to a 
mythical matriarchal society with roots in Ukrainian antiquity. Finally, most women 
in Ukraine have to work because families cannot survive with a single income. 
Therefore, the cult of Berehynia intensifies and fosters women's ''double burden", 
constructing them as the caretaker of the home and yet demanding that they also 
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used instead of the older spelling, Kiev, except for those titles of books where 
��K i ev� is used. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
I. Background 
In 1991 Ukraine declared itself independent and thus found itself faced with the 
dual tasks of building a state and a nation. Ukraine has never existed as an 
independent country except for a short period between 1917 and 1920, when the 
Ukrainian National Republic was established. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
more than ten years after it declared independence in 1991, the people and 
government of Ukraine are still actively engaged in a nation building project. This 
project requires a national revival, or perhaps more accurately, a national creation. 
To date, nation building is being pursued through a re-reading of identified 
monuments of Ukrainian culture, searching for elements that serve to construct the 
nation and legitimate its integrity.^ Insofar as the monuments of Ukrainian culture 
are from a past that extends as far back as ninth-century Kyiv, the elements 
discovered are rooted in a traditional (essentially peasant) culture. Thus this 
revival is distinctly patriarchal in nature and as such, represents a revival of a 
masculine culture.? 
Considerable scholarly work has been done on Ukraine's nationalism, nation 
building and state building. Taras Kuzio has authored a book and a number of 
different articles and papers on the Ukrainian nation and state.^ Andrew Wilson has 
analyzed Ukrainian nationalism as a minority faith when Ukraine gained 
independence in 1991, arguing that when Ukraine gained independence, it was a 
1 Taras Kuzio, Ukraine: State and Nation Building (London: Routledge) 1998, pp.4. Also 
Roman Szorpluk, "Nation-Building in Ukraine: Problems and Prospects", in Russia, Ukraine, 
and the Breakup of the Soviet Union (California: Stanford University Press) 2000, pp. 
315-326. 
2 Solomea Pavlychko, "Feminism in post-communist Ukrainian society" in Rosalind Marsh, 
(ed.), Women in Russia and Ukraine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1996, pp. 
305-311. 
3 Taras Kuzio, Nation and State Building in Ukraine (London: Routledge) 1998. 
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heterogeneous country, differentiated according to cultural, ethnic, economic, 
social, and linguistics factors. In his latest book, Wilson argues further that the 
Ukrainian nation was unexpected, emerging out of a chance series of events.^ 
While there is a substantial body of scholarship on Ukrainian national 
construction, typically both gender issues and women's issues are absent from this 
discussion. For example, in analyzing and exploring myths, national cults and 
historical memories, Kuzio does not discuss gender. Nor does he discuss how the 
identity and the imagery of women are being constructed in the post-independence 
nation building process. Yet, as will be discussed in more detail below, women 
inevitably play an important role in carrying and transmitting culture. Gender is 
thus essential for analyzing the discourse about the identity and image of women 
as it is emerging in the process of the construction and reconstruction of the nation 
and national identity in Ukraine. Given the fact that Ukraine is actively engaged in 
the project of nation building and various other transitions, women—as 
citizens—are assumed to be less ''important" and their questions and problems are 
considered less ''urgent" than the project as a whole. Such assumptions suggest 
that it is time for a critical review of how the nation building project is gendered. 
To date, little work has focused on women in Ukraine.6 Moreover, there is very 
little work on the intersection of Ukrainian nation building and gender. My ideas on 
these issues have been influenced by R. Radhakishnan's work on post-colonial 
4 Andrew Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press) 1997. 
5 See also Andrew Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press) 1997. Andrew Wilson, the Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation (New 
Heaven: Yale University Press) 2000. Stephen Shulman. "The Cultural Foundations of 
Ukrainian National Identity", Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 22, issue 6 (November 1999), pp. 
1011-1036. Also Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and leadership 
in Poland, Russia and Ukraine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1998. 
6 See three books Mary Buckley (ed.), Perestroika and The Soviet Woman (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press) 1992. Rosalind Marsh (ed.), Women in Russia and Ukraine 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1998. Mary Buckley (ed.), Post-Soviet Women: 
From Baltic to Central Asia (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press) 1997. 
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nationalism and gender in India/ Radhakishnan argues that Indian nationalism is 
a totalizing ideology. It is an overarching umbrella that subsumes all other issues. 
Thus in India today nationalists have appropriated women's questions and claim to 
speak on behalf of women when they speak the language and grammar of 
nationalism. My thinking has been further influenced by the work of Heng and 
Devan, who note the deeply gendered ways in which national duty is sexualized in 
Singapore. They argue, for example, that Singaporean women are urged to bear 
more chi ldren�� for the sake of their n a t i o n " . 
These ideas strike me as pertinent to the developing situation in Ukraine. For 
example, Ukraine has become a major center for the trafficking of women to the 
Middle East, Western Europe, and Asia, mostly for prostitution. Generally, the 
government turns a blind eye to this growing tragedy. At the same time, reports 
assert that some officials are involved in this trade and that they justify their 
activities by claiming that these women (and this business) are helping the nation 
by facilitating the acquisition of foreign currencies needed for development.^ 
Certainly this is a clear case where the needs of Ukrainian women are being 
sacrificed to the needs of''the nation". That the subordination of women's issues to 
the national project has been accomplished with so little scholarly attention is 
troubling. I propose, therefore, to critically examine the notion of nation and 
gender relations in post-Soviet Ukraine. I focus on the ongoing process of the 
construction and reconstruction of the identity of Ukrainian women and how their 
7 R. Radhakishnan, "Nationalism, Gender, and the Narrative of Identity", in Andrew Parker, 
Mary Russo, Doris Sommer and Patricia Yaeger (ed.), Nationalisms and Sexualities (New 
York: Routledge) 1992, pp. 78. 
8 Geraldine Heng and Jandas Devan,��State Fatherhood: The Politics of Nationalism" in 
Andrew Parker, Mary Russo, Doris Sommer and Patricia Yaeger (ed.). Nationalisms and 
Sexualities (New York: Routledge) 1992, pp. 109. 
9 See the Win rock International, Women's International Network News, vol. 25, issue 3 
(Summer 1999), p73. 
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gender roles in the nation are defined by the male leaders of the project. 
The identity of Ukrainian women as a national construction is based on the 
ancient pagan goddess Berehynia. Berehynia is represented as the protectress of 
Ukrainian traditions and values since antiquity. Her image is used to promote the 
cult of the mother, the child, the home and hearth, and thus to shape the desires 
and ambitions of contemporary Ukrainian women.丄。The cult of Berehynia became 
popular after the publication of Berehynia in 1987 by Ukrainian ethnographer Vasyl 
Skurativskyi. The author called for a revival not only of folk culture but also of the 
traditional rural mentality. This is a mentality that is hierarchical and patriarchal; 
children are subordinates to parents, youngsters to elders, and wives to husbands. 
When nation builders talk about the roles and duties of women, they typically 
refer to the example of this ancient goddess. The Berehynia cult is nationalized and 
legitimized; she is promoted as a model for Ukrainian women to follow. In the 
revival of Ukrainian culture in post-Soviet Ukraine, Berehynia is the central image 
and a profoundly gendered one. 
In order to analyze Ukrainian nation building, the construction of Ukrainian 
women's identity, and their intersection in the revival of the traditional Berehynia 
cult, I propose to trace the roots of the Berehynia cult. The following questions will 
guide my analysis of nation and gender in Ukrainian nation building: 
1. Do women in Ukraine think it is their duty to help their country in the project 
of nation building? If yes, is their conception o f��duty" gendered? 
2. What does it mean to be a ''Ukrainian Woman", or how do Ukrainian women 
talk about their own identity? 
See Solomea Pavlychko, "Progress on Hold: the Conservative Faces of Ukrainian Women", 
in Mary Buckley (ed.), Post-Soviet Women: From Baltic to Central Asia (Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press) 1997, pp. 219-234, and Marian J. Rubchak, "Christian 
virgin or pagan goddess", in Rosalind Marsh (ed.). Women in Russia and Ukraine (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press) 1998, pp. 316. 
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3. Does the cult of Berehynia play a role in Ukrainian women's self-identity? 
The Objectives of this essay will be: 
/ 
1. To explore the discourses of��nation", ''nationalism" and ''nation building〃； 
2. To examine the nature of the nation building project in post-Soviet Ukraine; 
3. To look at the role of cultural revival, collective memories, myths and writing 
of national history in the nation building project; 
4. To trace the historical root of the cult of Berehynia, its development and 
revival; 
5. To analyze the role and function of the revival of the Berehynia cult; 
6. To examine the responses of women and women's organizations to the 
project; 
7. To investigate the roles and duties of women in the national project. 
/- Methodology and Source Base 
My analysis of the relationship between nation and gender in Ukraine is 
grounded in gender theory. Textual analysis of Vasyl Skurativskyi's book Berehynia 
will be used, and the formation and depiction of the imagery, character, and identity 
of Berehynia will be the primary focus. This is Important for two reasons. Firstly, 
after the publication of V. Skurativskyi's book, Berehynia became popular as a 
model for many women in Ukraine. Emulating Berehynia was their ultimate 
ambition. Such popularity facilitates the construction of ideal gender roles in 
Ukrainian society. Secondly, the cult is frequently used by the Ukrainian 
government to gain the support of women. Therefore, the dynamic and interactive 
correlations of the political advocacy of a gendered nation project and the social 
construction of gender roles can be revealed in part through a close reading of the 
text upon which this imagery is based. Similarly, I will also explore the relations 
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between the cult and the project of Ukrainian nation building, in particular how the 
cult is manipulated in the gendered national project. My source base for this 
analysis will be newspapers, articles, and journals published in Ukraine, as well as 
those published in other places with large Ukrainian communities, such as Canada 
and the United States. For example, the journal Berehynia ("founded by Vasyl 
Skurativskyi), Ukrainian Weekly, the popular Ukrainian newspaper Den 
[fleHb/Day], and the women's magazine Zhinka [XiHKa/Women] are Important 
sources for this thesis. 
Secondary sources are also important in this thesis. I have selected the works 
of Ukrainian and Western historians, political scientists, anthropologists, social 
scientists, artists, archaeologists, feminists, and scholars in the field of gender 
studies. Some United Nations reports on gender issues in Ukraine are also used. 
II.Theoretical Framework 
In this thesis, three major concepts are discussed, namely those of nation, 
nationalism and the relationship between gender and nation. These concepts are 
important because they are central to the process of nation building in Ukraine. 
/. Nation and Nationalism 
��Nat ion� a d ''nationalism" are two key concepts in this thesis. However, the 
meanings of��nation" and ''nationalism" are themselves various and hotly debated. 
This presents considerable problems of definition and usage. Generally speaking, 
these concepts have been contested on two fronts. Firstly, scholars argue about the 
definitions of nation, and how nation as a form of identity differs from other types 
of collective identity. Secondly, there is considerable disagreement over the role of 
ethnicity in nationalism. 
6 
In his classic work on the nation, Ernest Renan argued that the past (historical 
memories, common glories and heritage) and the present (the strong desire to live 
together as a community) make up a nation. He stated that a nation is an 
''everyday plebiscite" and argued that a distinctive and common historical 
consciousness — the ''legacy of remembrances" — sustains the solidarity of a 
nation. 11 Max Weber explored the nation as a ''prestige community", one that 
included its own sense of cultural mission. He argued that people are unified 
through myths of common descent, and that this leads to the formation of ethnic 
communities in the nation. Furthermore, he believed that nations have a natural 
political inclination, arguing that a nation i s��a community which normally tends to 
produce a state of its own" ^^  
Two other eminent scholars of the nation, Anthony Giddens and Walker Connor, 
have profoundly different views of what those basic terms mean. Giddens gives a 
clear and state-oriented definition of a nation—it is a ''bordered power-container". i3 
Connor disagrees and argues that a nation is not equivalent to a state, and 
therefore nationalism is not the same as state patriotism. Connor's definition of a 
nation is close to that of Weber's, but he further attempts to distinguish between a 
nation and ethnic communities by the degree of self-consciousness and 
self-determination inherent to each. In Connor's view, an ethnic group tends to be 
"other-defined'', whereas a nation is ''self-defined''.^^ Despite these differences in 
the definition of a nation, there is one area of common ground: in a nation, 
Ernest Renan, "Qu'est-ce qu'une", Ida Mae Snyder (trans.), in John Hutchinson and 
Anthony D. Smith (ed.). Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 1994, pp. 17-18 
12 Max Weber, "The Nation", in Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright-Mills (ed. & trans.), From Max 
Weber: Essays in Sociology (London: Routledge and Keg an Paul) 1948, pp. 171, 175-177. 
^^Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, vol. 2., the 
Nation-State and Violence (Cambridge: Polity Press) 1985, pp. 119-121. 
Walker Connor,��A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a … … E t h n i c and 
Racial Studies, vol. 1, issue 4 (1978), pp. 379-388. Walker Conner, "When is a Nation?'； 
Ethnic and Radical Studies, vol. 13, issue 1 (1990), pp. 92-100. 
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''ideology and movement incorporate political and cultural dimensions"/^ 
Scholars differ widely over the definition of nation. It is therefore not surprising 
that the concept of "nationalism" also stimulates considerable disagreement. Some 
scholars argue that national communities are in fact simply an invention of 
intellectuals. Eric Hobsbawm argues critically that a nation is an ''invented 
tradition" of political elites, used for the purpose of legitimating their own power In 
times of revolution and change. It is thus merely a tool ruling elites utilize to 
legitimize and perpetuate their rule.^ ^ On this point, Benedict Anderson agrees 
with Hobsbawm. He regards a modern nation as��an imagined political community", 
an artificial rather than a natural outcome of events. He examines critically the role 
and function of a national language in constructing these imagined communities.^^ 
Anderson further argues that many elements of a nation can be understood as a 
form of imaginative creation that perpetually constructs and reconstructs itself as 
a homogeneous community.^ ® 
Ernest Gellner argues that the needs of modern societies for cultural 
homogeneity create nationalism, and thus nationalism is rooted in modernity.^^ 
Anthony Giddens, and Eric Hobsbawm are also modernists who believe in the close 
relation between modernity and nationalism. They argue that nationalism is a 
novel product of modernity. Since they regard both nations and nationalism as 
modern phenomena, they believe that neither have natural roots in the past.^ ° 
15 John Hutchison, The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism (London: Allen and Unwin) 1987, 
pp. 12-19. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (ed.). Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press) 1994, pp. 4. 
16 Eric Hobsbawm, and Terence Ranger (ed.). The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press) 1983, pp. 13-14. 
17 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London, New York: Verso) 1991, pp. 36. 
18 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London, New York: Verso) 1991, pp. 36-46. 
19 Ernest Gellner, "Nationalism" in Thought and Change (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press) 1964, pp. 158-162. 
2° See also Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell), 1983. 
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Anthony D. Smith argues that modernists fail to consider the ''weight of 
pre-existing cultures and ethnicities" as well as the pre-modern roots of nations. As 
a result, they neglect the sentiment of cultural identity in nations and 
nationalism.21 He focuses particularly on nationalism's sources of power—the 
��myths, memories, traditions, and symbol of ethnic heritages and the ways in 
which a popular living past" are re-discovered, re-interpreted and re-energized by 
nationalist intellectuals in constituting the sentiment of cultural identity. ^ ^ In 
opposition to the failure of modernists to more fully understand nationalism, Smith 
proposes an approach he calls historical ethno-symbolism. The central theme of 
this approach is how shared memories relate to collective cultural identities. In 
Smith's view, shared memories play an integral role in the formation of collective 
cultural identities and are essential not only to the survival but also to the destiny 
of such identities.^^ He argues that nations are historical, that is, they are formed 
over a long period of time and continue into the modern period. To understand 
nations and nationalism, it is necessary to investigate their historical roots. Thus 
historians play an important role in the writing and rediscovery of the shared 
long-term memories of members of nations, in composing their ethno-history, and 
thus in the cultivation of these collective cultural identities.^* 
Smith's analysis is interesting and insightful for three reasons. First, he offers 
an approach to the analysis of nations and nationalism that emphasizes the origins, 
cultural elements and the cultivation of shared memories as elements in the 
Anthony D. Smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press) 1999, pp. 9. 
Anthony D. Smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press) 1999, pp. 9-11, pp. 15. 
23 Anthony D. Smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press) 1999, pp. 18-19. 
Anthony D. Smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press) 1999, pp. 29-31. 
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formation of collective identities. Secondly, the ethno-history approach gives a 
more comprehensive analysis of the concepts of both nation and nationalism, as 
well as emphasizing their historicity. Thirdly, in understanding nation and 
nationalism, the role that historians play in rediscovering ethnic myths and 
memories is critically important. Some scholars even regard historians as nation 
builders, seeing them as highly significant in nation building projects. 
John Hutchinson's work focuses on political nationalism and cultural 
nationalism. Interestingly, he points out that many nationalist historians, for 
example the Ukrainian Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, are ''myth-making" intellectuals 
''who combine a�� r oman t i c� search for meaning with a scientific zeal to establish 
this on authoritative foundations''^^ and who typically form a � � m y t h i c � pattern, 
which includes a founding myth, a golden age, an age of decay and the destiny of 
regeneration. With the help of scientific advances, documents of pre-modern 
histories can be recovered through the findings of archaeology and the work of 
folklorists. He uses the Ukrainian case to illustrate his argument. The re-discovery 
of a Ukrainian golden past is supported by the parallel development of scientific 
research. Thus��myth" and��science'" come together in the intellectual activity of 
nation building. The former is supported and "proven" by the latter.26 
In view of intensifying globalization, the forces of nationalism and 
internationalism may need to be balanced against one another. Since 1991, a new 
wave of nationalism has emerged as a result of the formation of fourteen new 
states after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. John Armstrong's work on 
nationalism in the post-Soviet period focuses on the antagonistic relationship 
25 John Hutchinson, The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism (London: Allen and Unwin) 1987, 
pp. 12-14. 
26 John Hutchinson, The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism (London: Allen and Unwin) 1987, 
pp. 12-14. 
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between Intensifying economic, cultural and political globalization and the 
resurgence of ethnic nationalisms. For example, he argues that nationalism in 
Ukraine is only visible in Western Ukraine.^^ In his analysis of voting behavior on 
the eve of Ukrainian independence, he regards independence as a mixed blessing. 
Some people organized strikes against it, although the majority of people in 
Ukraine supported it. The Crimea question perpetually affects the status quo of the 
newly independent country. Such analysis reveals the complexity of the context of 
nationalism even before it comes into being. 
The concept of national identity has also been affected by the emergence of 
globalized economies. Homi Bhaba, for example, discusses the Self/Other split. He 
argues that the everyday performativity of Self re-defines national identity. Such 
re-definition is only formed when there is reference to an Other.^ ^ Certainly, the 
concept of Self and Other in relation to the nation is relevant to the Ukrainian case. 
In particular it problematizes the very meaning of Ukrainian national identity. 
Ukrainian identity is formed with reference to other contiguous or competing 
identities, for instance Russian. One visible example is in everyday language. In 
order to distinguish Ukrainian language from Russian, a lot of Ukrainian phrases 
and vocabularies have been revised and re-energized to more clearly differentiate 
these two languages. As a result of the globalized economic system, there is 
increasing contact between peoples of different national identities. Such contact 
constantly leads to the definition and re-definition of national identities. 
Post-Soviet Ukrainian identities are constructed on the Self/Other split. Ukrainians 
define themselves as ''not Russians". It is thus against the reflection of Russian 
27 John Armstrong, "Nationalism in Former Soviet Empire", Problems of Communism, vol. 41, 
issue 1-2 (January-April 1992), pp. 129-133. 
28 Homi Bhaba, (ed.), The Nation and Narration (London, New York: Routledge) 1990, pp. 
1-6. 
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identity that Ukrainian identity is constructed.^^ 
II. Ukrainian Nationalism 
Many scholars interested in Ukrainian nationalism and nation building apply 
several ideas and definitions of nation and nationalism to the Ukrainian context. To 
be precise, they concentrate on ethnic nationalism, or Ukrainophone nationalism. 
In these analyses, language plays an important role in distinguishing nationalism in 
the Ukrainian case. This may be problematic. Using Smith's ethnic categories, 
''populations distinguished by outsiders as possessing the attributes of a common 
name or emblem, a shared cultural element (usually language or religion) and a 
link with a particular territory", Ukrainian nationalism is weak and questionable. 
Ukraine has not existed as a separate entity for very long, Ukrainians were not 
regarded as ''Ukrainians" by others historically, and the Ukrainian language is not a 
common language among Ukrainians. Here it is useful to recall Smith's definition of 
ethnie (ethnic communities) 一、、as a named human population with myths of 
common ancestry, shared historical memories and one or more common elements 
of culture, including an association with a homeland, and some degree of solidarity, 
at least among the elites''.^ ^ This is interesting and relevant to the Ukrainian case. 
Ukrainian nation builders are currently re-reading and redefining monuments and 
integrating them into the myths of Ukrainian ancestry, homeland and common 
memories. Smith analysis also includes some African and Asian countries that try 
to turn post-colonies into nations through the construction of myths, symbols, and 
historical memories, and therefore to build nations based on pre-existing ethnic 
29 See Taras Kuzio, "Identity and Nation Building in Ukraine: Defining the 'Other"； in 
Ethnicities, vol. 1, no. 3 (December 2001), pp. 343-366. 
Taras Kuzio, ''Nationalism in Ukraine: Towards a New Framework", Politics, vol�20, no. 2 
(May 2000), pp. 77-86. 
31 Anthony D. Smith, "The Origins of Nations", Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 12, issue 3 
(1989), pp. 349-356. 
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ties.32 Similar processes can be found in Ukraine's nation building project. Myths, 
symbols and historical memories are also manipulated in Ukraine's nation building 
project, as will be discussed in a later chapter. The manipulation and creation of 
national imagery is critically important to the Ukrainian nation building project. 
iii. Gender and Nation 
Does a nation have a gender? Is a nation gendered? These are critical questions 
that need to be addressed. 
The relation of gender and nation challenges the cliched position of women in 
the political sphere.� ‘Nation" and ''nationalism'' are political concepts; they are 
written and formulated mostly by male political scientists or male researchers. In 
these concepts, men and women are not distinguished. No distinctions are made 
when addressing positions, roles, duties and the rights of men and women in the 
political sphere. Nonetheless, in practice, men and women do have different roles, 
duties and rights. Politics and the political sphere are male-oriented. In these 
arenas women have few channels to voice their views. Male leaders claim to speak 
on behalf of the whole population (read both men and women) when in fact they 
speak on behalf of their own interests. 
Although the gender-blind approach in analyzing nation and national projects is 
often critiqued because of its insensitivity to much of their complexity,^^ it is still 
useful in illustrating how women are incorporated into national projects and how 
masculine and feminine identities are constructed and reconstructed in these 
projects. The relations of gender and nation are gaining attention from scholars. 
To correlate gender and nation or nationalism is not easy. Traditionally, studies 
32 Anthony D. Smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press) 1999, pp. 9-10. 
33 Deniz Kandiyot i ,��Guest editor's introduction. The awkward relationship: gender and 
nationalism". Nation and Nationalism, vol. 6, issue 4 (2000), pp.491-494. 
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on nation and nationalism in academic fields are essentially masculine. A male 
perspective is typically taken for granted. Thus, the inclusion of gender in 
discussions of nation and nationalism is quite a recent trend. Gender as a category 
of analysis stimulates scholars to look from a totally new and previously ignored 
perspective, to challenge and reconstruct the mainstream male-centered 
knowledge system and scholarly disciplines such as history and political science. 
The work of Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias attempts to engender national 
projects. They argue that women's links to nations are complex because of their 
dual roles as citizens and as a social category that has special functions vital to the 
reproduction of nations themselves. 34 They analyze women's role in national 
reproduction, national culture and national citizenship. They argue that women 
are vital to the reproduction of the nation in at least five different ways: as 
biological reproducers of ethnic collectives and groups; as ideological reproducers 
and transmitters of culture; as signifiers of ethnic/national differences; as a focus 
and symbol in ideological discourses; and as participants in economic, social and 
political realms. 
In a later work, Yuva卜Davis carries this analysis further, identifying the 
correlations of gender to various categories of national projects. She further 
discusses how gender relations, national projects and processes operate in an 
interactive way, shaping the ''positions and positionings" of women. She questions 
mainstream scholars, who essentially talk about the importance of state 
bureaucrats or intellectuals in the "production and reproduction" of the nation, but 
ignore women. She argues��that it is women not (just?) the bureaucrats and 
34 Nira Yuva卜Davis, and Floya Anthias, (ed.), Women-Nation-State (Houndmilis, 
Basingstoke and Hampshire: Macmillan) 1989, pp.6-11. 
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intellectuals who reproduce nations, biologically, culturally, and symbolically".^^ 
Ill-Significance 
This thesis aims at engendering the project of nation building in Ukraine. It 
aims to explore and uncover the nature of such a project from a gendered 
perspective and thus extend our understanding of the Ukrainian nation building 
processes. 
As one of the most important and fundamental reforms, nation building is 
obviously a political subject. Yet politics and political discourse are male-dominated. 
They are part of the public-private, male-female configuration. Talking about 
women in the political sphere challenges this academic norm. Interest in the 
relationship between nation and gender is growing in academia. This thesis hopes 
to make a contribution to the current discussion about nation and gender. 
States in transition prioritize various reforms and issues. Certainly, for most 
states women's issues and gender issues are regarded as less urgent and less 
important. Both Russia and China represent good examples of the low priority 
given to women and gender issues in transitional states. Post-Soviet Ukraine offers 
another example. 
Women and gender issues in post-Soviet Ukraine are rarely addressed. Other 
reforms such as political and economic reforms take center stage. Therefore, this 
thesis aims at filling this gap. Its goal is to emphasize that the so-called ''all people" 
project is indeed profoundly gendered. Women and men have different duties and, 
critically, women's duties are defined by male leaders. Nonetheless, these 
gendered national duties are seldom made explicit or discussed by Ukrainian nation 
35 Nira Yuva卜Davis, Gender and Nation (London: Sage Publications) 1997, pp. 3. 
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builders, scholars in the field of Ukrainian studies, or even women's organizations 
in Ukraine. Thus, this thesis aims at exploring the fundamentally gendered nature 
of the Ukrainian nation building project. 
IV. Outline of Chapters 
The goal of the thesis is to engender the nation building project in post-Soviet 
Ukraine. Thus, the first section of the thesis explores the content of Ukrainian 
nation building, including the motivating forces behind the nation building project, 
the impact of Russification, and the diversity of its population. Arguably, 
contemporary Ukraine's nation building resembles the Cossack experience in the 
seventeenth century. Certainly, the Cossack state was a military and a 
male-dominated state in which women had almost no place and no power. Thus, 
the present recovery and use of the Cossack state in constituting the Ukrainian 
nation continues this male-oriented tradition. Therefore, it is important to discuss 
the nature of the Cossack state and how it is now idealized and nationalized as 
central to Ukraine's national construction. 
The second section of the thesis aims to analyze the content of the nation 
building project. This part contributes to the thesis in two ways. Firstly, it provides 
factual information about the nation building project in Ukraine. Secondly, it 
critically examines the context of this project. It particularly highlights the lack of 
gender analysis in the discussion of Ukrainian nation building. 
The third section contributes to the goal of this thesis by attempting to fill this 
gap. It analyses women's national duties from a gender perspective. It examines 
the different national duties of women and men in the nation building project, and 
thus this section proves the gendered nature of the project. 
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The fourth section discusses the responses of non-governmental women's 
organizations, women, and mass media to the call of cultural revival and the cult of 
Berehynia in Ukraine. It also explores some of the reasons for the growing 
popularity of the cult of Berehynia among women. Nonetheless, being Berehynia 
by staying at home is an unrealizable dream for most. In reality, the great 
majority of women must work. The cult of Berehynia intensifies women's "double 
burden". Thus, this section contributes to the thesis by uncovering some of the 
problems of these sexualized national duties. 
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Chapter 2: Nation Building in the Post-Soviet Ukraine 
I. Introduction 
On 24 August 1991, the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic (Ukrainian SSR) declared independence from the former Soviet Union by 
a vote of three hundred and forty-six to one. The Declaration of Independence was 
then published declaring "Ukraine an independent and democratic state". i A 
general vote was held in the Ukrainian SSR on the issue of independence. A vast 
majority, 90.2 percent of the population, supported independence. On 1 December 
1991, a referendum was held to confirm independence. 
Although Ukraine appeared on the world stage as an independent and 
sovereign country about eleven years ago, some scholars and Ukrainian historians 
argue that it is not a new country. Paul R. Magocsi, a leading historian of Ukraine 
comments that Ukraine ''was hardly a new country".? Ilya Prizel, another famous 
expert on Ukrainian affairs makes a similar statement ''Ukraine is by no means a 
new nation".3 Both argue that Ukrainians have been a separate ethnic group for 
centuries and yet did not have their own state. Therefore, when Ukraine gained its 
independence as a state in 1991, it was a hidden state that was revealed on the 
world stage. 
This chapter focuses on the ongoing project of nation building in post-Soviet 
Ukraine. Ukrainian nation building refers to the redefinition and amalgamation of 
various identities into a singular Ukrainian national identity, on that compels both 
unity and loyalty. Such redefinition is vital to Ukrainian nation building because of 
1 News From Ukraine (Kyiv), September 1991. 
2 Paul Magosci, A History of Ukraine (Seattle: University of Washington Press) 1996, pp.vii. 
3 Ilya Prizel,��Nation-已uilding and Foreign Policy", in Sharon L. Wolchik, Volodymyr 
Zviglyanich (ed.), Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers) 2000, pp.11. 
18 
its diverse cultural, ethnic, socio-economic, and linguistic circumstances. Facing 
antagonist forces of separation and division, the Ukrainian government believes 
that a nation will bind the heterogeneous population together and thus will prevent 
it from falling apart. Changes in the historical representations of Ukraine, and the 
revival of Ukrainian culture are two of the various sites of nationalizing that are 
under way in the cultivation of a Ukrainian collective identity. 
Yet, the historical foundation of the Ukrainian nation building project is a 
problematic one, since Ukraine had never existed before as an independent nation, 
except for the short period of the Ukrainian National Republic (1917-1920). 
Therefore, the first section of this chapter will trace the historical statelessness of 
Ukraine and the development of the struggle for autonomy and independence 
beginning in the late nineteenth century. This section serves not only as the 
background for the development of present-day Ukraine but also sheds light on 
some of the justifications for the choices being made in the contemporary process 
of nation building. 
This chapter also deals with the ''Ukrainian Question". This refers to the 
historical aspects of Ukraine and Ukrainians in Russian history and historiography. 
The Russian perception of Ukraine and Ukrainians is important, not only because 
this impacts the legitimacy of Ukraine as an independent country throughout 
history, but also because it influences Russian-Ukrainian relations today. 
The second section of this chapter focuses on the Cossack state (1648-1711), 
also known as the Hetmanate. The Cossack experience occupies a special position 
in Ukrainian national history. This is not only because various historians believe 
that the Cossacks were a democratic and freedom loving people and thus embodied 
the best characteristics of Ukrainians, but also because the Cossacks were believed 
to have adopted a defensive and antagonistic attitude against neighboring powers 
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in the effort to preserve their freedom. Today, the Cossack experience is largely 
idealized and nationalized as the proto-Ukrainian state. Cossack symbols and 
figures are being assimilated into the process of nation building as important 
symbols of the new Ukrainian state of today. Therefore, it is essential to analyze the 
nature of the Cossack state, which was essentially military and male-oriented, and 
thus its implications for the position of women in the current nation building 
project. 
The third part of the chapter analyzes the content of contemporary Ukrainian 
nation building. The project of nation building is complex and vital to the Ukrainian 
government and its peoples because it goes back to the fundamental ideological 
foundation of the Ukrainian nation, its legitimacy and justification as a nation, and 
the sources of identity for its citizens. The project also affects the people of Ukraine 
in various aspects of their lives. It also has an impact on Ukraine's relations with 
other countries, particularly Russia. The project attracts enormous attention from 
political scientists, scholars of nationalism, ethnic relations, and experts of Eastern 
European affairs. Yet, the nature of the project is essentially Ukrainian-centered, 
nationalist and male-dominated. 
II.Ukraine: Historical Statelessness 
I. The Borders 
The name ��Ukraine" [YKpama/ Ukrama] means undefined or non-specific 
borderland.4 The term "Ukraine'' first appeared in the chronicles in 1187, upon the 
death of Prince Volodymyr of Pereislav. The Hypatian text of the Primary Chronicle 
4 Paul Magosci, A History of Ukraine (Seattle: University of Washington Press) 1996, pp.171. 
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writes ''the ukra'fna groaned with grief for him". ^ The term ukrama meant 
non-specified, and undefined lands.^ Geographically, it was known as a buffer zone 
between the eastern and western parts of Europe. Because of its strategic 
importance, Ukraine was historically vulnerable to various powers, mainly Poland, 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Imperial Russia and later the Soviet Union. 
Consequently, Ukraine was not autonomous, nor did other great powers of that 
time regard Ukraine as a separate polity. The inhabitants of the regions were not 
called Ukrainians. In fact, they were known as the "Little Russians", or the little 
brothers of the Great Russians, in familial terms. Its culture was regarded as a folk 
culture of the peasantry and not considered comparable to��h igh" Russian culture. 
The Ukrainian language was also considered to be merely a local dialect of Russian, 
one spoken only by peasants. 
Ukraine did not refer to a specific territory until the Cossacks claimed it as their 
romanticized��fat:herland� or �mother". After 1917 the Hetmanate began to use the 
term��Ukra ine� to indicate the lands ethnic Ukrainians inhabited in order to arouse 
nationalistic feeling/ The Central Rada (council) of Ukraine and the Hetmanate 
named the country the Ukrainian National Republic [Ukramska Narodna 
Respublyka'] (1917-1920) when they attempted, for the first time in Ukrainian 
history, to create an independent Ukraine. Therefore, the name "Ukraine" has had 
different meanings over time, and has served different aims. 
Ukraine as a geographic term refers to the territory of present-day Ukraine, a 
territory that has been under the rule of various foreign powers for most of its 
history, in particular Poland, Lithuania and Russia. An independent Ukrainian polity 
5 According to the Hypatian text of the Primary Chronicle (copied in the century. Quoted 
in Paul Magosci, A History of Ukraine (Seattle: University of Washington Press) 1996, pp. 
171. 
6 Paul Magosci, A History of Ukraine (Seattle: University of Washington Press) 1996, pp.171. 
7 Paul Magosci, A History of Ukraine (Seattle: University of Washington Press) 1996, pp.171. 
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has only existed twice in the modern era. The first one was the Ukrainian National 
Republic (1917-1920) before it was crushed by the Bolsheviks. The second is the 
present day Ukraine that largely occupies the land of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic of the former Soviet Union. 
//. The 'Ukrainian Question' 
The "Ukrainian Quest ion"® centers on the nature of the Russian-Ukrainian 
relationship. It refers to the historical aspects of Ukraine, Ukrainians, and their 
culture in relation to Russian history and historiography. Russians did not regard 
Ukrainians as a separate ethnic group. Instead, Russians perceived Ukrainians in 
terms of the familial metaphor ''little brothers". They were thus distinct but akin 
and most importantly, subordinate.^ They were members of the Eastern Slavs, of 
which there were three groups—Great Russians (Russians), Little Russians 
(Ukrainians), and White Russians (Belarusians). They came from the same family, 
but their positions were hierarchical. The terminology used assumes and expresses 
this hierarchy. The Russians were��Grea t� a n d � � B i g � brothers, indicating their 
leadership and superiority in the family. The Ukrainians were、、！Jttle〃； they had no 
privilege, no greatness and were primarily constructed as followers and 
subordinates. The hierarchy applied equally to the Great Russian views on 
Ukraine's history, culture and languages. Legitimated by the familial metaphor, 
Ukrainians and the lands they inhabited were viewed as integral parts of the 
Russian Empire. Therefore, the Ukrainian challenge, or more precisely Ukrainian 
nationalism, was described as a ''problem" because it represented separatism that 
would not only destabilize the integrity of the Russian state but would also 
8 Roman Szporluk, Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union (California: 
Stanford University Press) 2000, Forward xxvii. 
9 Roman Szporluk, Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union (California: 
Stanford University Press) 2000, Forward xi. 
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undermine its unity and thus destroy the�� family". Any ideas about Ukrainian 
independence were thus to be eradicated at all costs. As a result, all struggles for 
an independent Ukrainian nation were put down by the "elder brother". 
The familial metaphor also affected Russian historiography on Ukraine and 
Ukrainians. For centuries, Russians regarded Ukraine and Ukrainians as part of the 
great Imperial Russian Empire. As Zbigniew Brzezinski argues, ''without Ukraine, 
Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, 
Russia automatically becomes an emp i r e " . Z . Brzezinski's statement critically 
pinpoints the importance of Ukraine and Ukrainians to Russia. 
Russian historiography has not only significantly affected the Ukrainian claims 
to independence and identity, but is also an important factor in the shaping of 
Russian-Ukrainian relations in the post-Soviet period. 
III. Russian Historiography: Origins of Ethnicity and Culture 
Russian historiography about Ukraine and Ukrainians was a significant factor in 
the determination of Ukrainian status. Therefore, it is necessary to trace the 
development of Russian historiography focused on Ukraine and Ukrainians. 
The Russian historians Vasilii M. Tatishchev (1686—1750) and Nikolai M. 
Karamzin (1766—1826) believed that Russian culture and the Russian state 
emerged around Kyiv in the ninth century. Both of them affirmed that Kyi van Rus' 
was the beginning of the Great Russians, who were one of the three major groups 
of the Kyi van State. Little Russians (Ukrainians) and White Russians were the other 
two. 11 
1° Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'The Premature Partnership" in Foreign Affairs, vol.73, no.2 
(March-April 1994), pp.80. 
11 Paul Magosci,y4 History of Ukraine (Seattle: University of Washington Press) 1996, pp. 13. 
See also Thomas Sanders (ed.), Historiography of Imperial Russia. The Profession and 
Writing of History in Multinational State (New York, London: M.E. Sharpe) 1999, pp. 
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By the nineteenth century, the main theme of Russian historiography centered 
on asserting a linear relation from the ruling house of Kyi van Rus', through Muscovy 
to the Russian Empire. These historians took a dynastic approach to Russian history, 
exemplified by Karamzin's twelve-volume History of the Russian State [Istoriia 
Gosudarstva Rossiiskago]. His books glorified the tsars as the legitimate rulers and 
as the descendents of the Kyi van Rus' rulers. Essentially, genealogical lineage and 
descent was emphasized/^ Also, Kyiv was constructed as the ''mother of Russian 
cities" because it was the first political center of the Russian people. On the grounds 
that Muscovite princes were the legitimate heirs of Kyi van Rus', these historians 
argued that the destiny of the princes was to once again unite all the former lands 
of Kyi van Rus' under the authority of the Muscovite th rone” 
The traditional view identified Great Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians as 
Russians, with Ukrainians and Belarusians as sub-groups of the Great Russians. 
Modern Russian historians continued this historiography. Sergei M. Solovev 
(1820-1879) and Vasilii Kliuchevsky (1841—1911) included Ukrainian and 
Belarusian affairs when they wrote about the history of Russia, aiming at the 
assimilation of Ukrainians and Belarusians into the ''all-Russian" people's identity.i4 
Yet, great Russians were certainly at the center when these affairs were recorded. 
Although Russian historians believed in a single Russian identity (Great, Little and 
White Russians), they were gradually forced to acknowledge the differences 
334-362. 
Paul Magosci, A History of Ukraine (Seattle: University of Washington Press) 1996, pp. 14. 
See also Thomas Sanders (ed.), Historiography of Imperial Russia. The Profession and 
Writing of History in Multinational State (New York, London: M.E. Sharpe) 1999, pp.334-362, 
379-384. 
13 Paul Magosci, A History of Ukraine (Seattle: University of Washington Press) 1996, pp. 14. 
See also Thomas Sanders (ed.). Historiography of Imperial Russia. The Profession and 
Writing of History in Multinational State (New York, London: M.E. Sharpe) 1999, pp. 205 
14 Paul Magosci, A History of Ukraine (Seattle: University of Washington Press) 1996, pp. 15. 
See also Thomas Sanders (ed.), Historiography of Imperial Russia. The Professional and 
Writing of History in Multinational State (New York, London: M.E. Sharpe) 1999, pp. 
334-362. 
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between these three groups of people. In the 1920s, Russian historian Nikolai 
Trubetskoi accepted that Ukrainian and Great Russian culture were not the same 
before 1654.15 yet, the admission of differences was potentially dangerous. It 
could not only undermine the idea of a single Russia identity, but also threatened 
the link between Kyiv and Moscow on which imperial Russian history was built. 
Furthermore, Russians could continue to disregard the Ukrainians' challenge to the 
idea of a singular, hierarchical Russian identity provided that they possessed the 
political, military and economic power necessary to suppress any opposition. The 
attitude of Russia towards Ukraine could be best summarized in the words of 
Dmitrii Likhachev, the dean of twentieth century Russian specialists of Kyi van Rus'. 
Over the course of the centuries following their division into two entities, 
Russia and Ukraine have formed not only a political but also a culturally 
dualistic unity. Russian culture is meaningless without Ukrainian, as 
Ukrainian is without Russian.^ ^ 
For generations, Russian intellectuals believed that the partition of Poland, 
where a vast majority of the population was ethnic Ukrainians and Belarusians, was 
necessary to liberate the Eastern Slavs from Catholic Polish rule. Thus, the partition 
of Poland was viewed as necessary to the integrity of the Russian Empire. At the 
same time, Ukrainian identity and Ukrainian separatism was state-mandated and 
manipulated by the Austro-Hungahan Empire and the Poles, with the aim of 
destroying Russia from within.^ ^ Although the inclusion of Ukraine and Ukrainians 
might be an��ev i l� in the light of theories of the self-determination of nationalities, 
Paul Magosci, A History of Ukraine (Seattle: University of Washington Press) 1996, pp� 
13-15. 
16 Dmitrii S. Likhachev, Nicolai N. Petro (ed.), Christina Sever (trans.). Reflections on Russia 
(Boulder: Westview Press) 1991, pp. 74. 
17 Roman Szporluk, Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union (California: 
Stanford University Press) 2000, pp.335. 
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It was regarded as a lesser evil when compared with the potential threats from 
Poland.18 
Traditional Russian historiography was largely accepted by Western scholars 
working in the field of Russian history. Many of them view the��Rus" of Kyi van Rus' 
as Russians. It would, however, be problematic to write Kyi van Rus' as ''Kyi van 
Russia�.i9 Textbooks of Russian history written by western scholars continue to 
adopt the imperial Russian historiography acknowledging the genealogical lineage 
from Kyi van Rus' to Muscovy and to Imperial Russia. The authors also recognize the 
Muscovite princes as the legitimate heirs to the Kyi van Rus' throne. Such 
Russo-centric historiography would benefit from a consideration of Ukrainian 
historiography. 
iV. Ukrainian Historiography: Suppression and Revival 
For approximately half a century, the study of Ukrainian history separate from 
Great Russian history was prohibited in the Russian Empire. Histories written about 
Ukraine were written as histories of Little Russians. The reasons for prohibition 
were rooted in the Russian view of Ukraine and Ukrainians. Suppression of the 
Ukrainian language and the study and research of Ukrainian history undermined 
Ukrainian historical development and knowledge. Ukrainian was not an academic 
subject, neither was the use of the word ''Ukraine" approved in academies. Writing 
in the Ukrainian language was also banned under the Valuev decree of 1863 and 
the Ems ukase of 1876. As a result, the language was mostly classified as one used 
by the��unlearned� and peasants. It was not a�‘scholarly language". 
18 Konstantin F. Shteppa, T h e�� L e s s e r Evil" Formula； in Cyril E. Black, (ed.), Rewriting 
Russian History: Soviet Interpretations of Russia's Past (New York: Vintage), ed., rev., 
1962, pp. 105-106. 
19 For example, "Kievan Russia" was used in John M. Thompson, Russia and The Soviet 
Union: A Historical Introduction from the Kievan State to the Present (Boulder, Oxford, San 
Francisco: Westview Press), 3� " ed., 1994, 12-13. 
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Not until the nineteenth century, did Ukrainians' challenge this one-sided 
Russian historiography. One of the most influential and pioneering histories of 
Ukraine was the History of the Rus' People [Istoriia Rusov]. The authorship is 
uncertain, but it was one of the first works that considered Ukraine as neither a 
province of Poland nor Russia. It gave Ukraine an independent status and 
Ukrainians a separate identity. 
The foremost challenge of Ukrainian historians to the foundation of the Russian 
Empire was with regard to the link between ancient Kyi van Rus' and the Muscovite 
state. The issue of the true heir to Kyi van Rus' was fiercely debated between 
Russian historian Mikhail Pogodin (1800—1875) and Ukrainian historian Mykhailo 
Maksymovych (1804—1873) .Bu t it was Ukraine's greatest modern historian, 
Mykhailo Hrushevskyi (1866—1934), who wrote Ukraine's national history, 
stretching from the ancient golden era of Kyi van Rus' to the early modern period of 
the Ukrainian people — The History of Ukraine-Rus\ This work continues to serve 
as the national history of Ukrainians, in that it argues that Ukraine ought to be a 
nation in its own right. Based on the argument that the Muscovite state should not 
and could not be the heir of Kyi van Rus', Mykhailo Hrushevskyi secured for Ukraine 
and Ukrainians a foundation of legitimacy for claims that Ukraine was a separate 
entity with the right to be a separate state. The History suggested a linear 
relationship between Kyi van Rus' and modern Ukraine. It challenged Russia's 
monopolistic claim to be the successor of the ancient state and, in doing so, also 
challenged the foundation upon which Russian history and historiography had been 
built.2i The History and Mykhailo Hrushevskyi both announced and symbolized the 
Frank Sysyn, ''Introduction to Mykahilo Hrushevsky's History of Ukraine-Rus"', in Thomas 
Sanders (ed.)/ Historiography of Imperial Russia. The Professional and Writing of History in 
Multinational State (New York, London: M.E. Sharpe) 1999, pp.344-373. 
21 Mykhailo Hrushevskyi,��“The Traditional Scheme of ''Russian" History and the Problem of a 
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revival of national consciousness of Ukrainians in the late nineteenth century and 
the early twentieth century as well. 
Similarly, another prominent Ukrainian historian, Mykola Kostomarov 
(1817-1885), argued that Ukrainians, Russians and Poles were three different 
groups. He critically and directly challenged the traditional authoritative Russian 
historian N. Karamzin's scheme of history.^^ He insisted that Ukrainian uniqueness 
provided the legitimization for an independent Ukrainian state. His work Two Rus' 
Nationalities [Dve Russkie Narodnosti], which became the gospel of Ukrainian 
nationalism, described and analyzed Ukrainian uniqueness and the differences 
between Ukrainians and Russians. 
The Ukrainians are characterized by individualism, the Great Russians by 
collectivism...Ukrainians were able to create among themselves free forms 
of society which controlled no more than was required...they were strong in 
themselves without infringing on personal liberties... 
He also marked the differences between Ukrainians and Poles. 
To be sure, there is a deep gulf which separates the Poles and the 
Ukrainians, a gulf which may never be bridged...the Poles are aristocratic 
while the Ukrainians are a democratic people....The Polish nobility has tried 
to remain within the limitations of its own class; in Ukraine, on the other 
hand, the people have equal status and rights.. 
Rational Organization of the History of the Eastern Slavs", in From Kievan Rus" To Modern 
Ukraine: Formation of the Ukrainian Nation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainians Studies) 
1984, pp.355-364. 
Thomas Prymak,��Mykola Kostomarov As a Historian", in Thomas Sanders (ed.), 
Historiography of Imperial Russia. The Professional and Writing of History in Multinational 
State (New York, London: M.E. Sharpe) 1999, pp.332-333. 
23 Dmytro Doroshenko, Survey of Ukrainian Historiography (New York Annals of the 
Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.), 1957, vol. V-VI, no. 4 (18)-1, 2(19-20), 
pp. 137-139. 
Dmytro Doroshenko, Survey of Ukrainian Historiography (New York: the An'nals of the 
Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.), 1957, vol. V-VI, no. 4 (18)=1, 2(19-20), 
pp. 137-139. 
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Ukrainian independence in 1991 further troubled the myth of Russian identity. 
Critically, Kyiv, the ancient center of Kyi van Rus； the cradle of Russian civilization, 
and the place where the myth of Russian identity was generated, had become the 
capital of another country. This represented a serious blow to Russians and Russia. 
Oleg Platonov, doctor of economic sciences, member of the Russian Writer's Union, 
and the author of Russian Labor and Russian Civilization, expressed his views on 
Ukraine. 
The creation of the��s ta tes� of Ukraine and Belorussia has an artificial and 
temporary character..When I speak of the Russian nation...! have in mind all 
its geographical parts including Ukrainians and Belorussians.^^ 
Another prominent and influential scholar Alexander Solzhenitsyn questioned 
Ukrainian territorial claims. According to him, Ukraine could only have the right to 
rule those regions inhabited by a majority of Ukrainian-speaking people. He 
condemned Lenin's borders arrangements, arguing that they paid insufficient 
attention to issues of ethnicity, and thus had created the problems on Ukraine's 
borders today.^ ^ 
Russian perceptions of Ukraine and Ukrainians have been a significant factor in 
denying Ukraine's demand to be an independent state. This historical statelessness 
has various effects on today's nation building project. As Ukraine has not had a 
state and a nation of its own, it has been required to build one. Ukrainian 
historiography has thus occupied a central place in Ukraine's nation building project, 
as will be discussed later in this chapter. 
��Mi r russkoi tsivilizatsii", in Literaturnaia Rossiia, no.6 (11 February 1997), pp.7. Quoted 
in Roman Szporluk, Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union (California: 
Stanford University Press) 2000, pp.333. 
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III.The Cossack State 
I. Origin/Nature of the Cossack State 
A relatively distinct polity in Ukraine can be traced back to the Cossacks of the 
seventeenth century. The Cossacks and the Cossack state both occupy a special 
position in the national history of Ukraine. 
Some historians maintain that the Cossacks were originally a group of 
borderland defenders or warriors who sought to protect their homeland from the 
invasions of foreign powers around it. These Cossacks may have been fishermen, 
hunters, farmers and traders. Others argue that they were people who fled from 
Central Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to escape from 
oppression and famine. 
By the fifteenth century, the Cossacks were occasionally employed by 
Lithuanian officials for borderland protection. The Cossacks lived in the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth for more than a century. Their large-scale 
migration to Zaporizhzhia happened as a result of the Union of Lublin in 1569.^ ^ 
The Cossacks were self-governing and had their own leaders, who were called 
hetman. Arguably, the Cossack era led to the gradual development of a 
proto-Ukrainian identity. 
The Cossack state did not survive long after the Treaty of Pereiaslav in 1654. 
The last Cossack fortress, the Sich fortress, was finally destroyed in 1775 and the 
Cossack settlement was dissolved into��New Russia".28 Yet, the Cossack state 
serves as a special and a unique historical experience and attracts extensive study 
27 Paul Magosci, A History of Ukraine (Seattle: University of Washington Press) 1996, 
pp.181. 
28 Andrew Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in 1990s: A Minority Faith (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press) 1997, pp. 7 
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and research by historians in the Ukrainian studies field. The prominent Ukrainian 
historian Mykhailo Hrushevskyi credited the Cossacks with cultivating a separate 
Ukrainian identity. 
The Cossack experience was a positive factor contributing to the legitimacy of a 
separate Ukrainian identity. Their success was remembered by Ukrainians. Since 
the nineteenth century, the Cossacks, the Zaporizhzhian Sich, and the hetmanate 
have been regarded as part of a populist movement against the authority and 
oppression of the Russian Empire. They have also served as a symbol of continuous 
struggle for self-determination and autonomy against strong and aggressive 
neighbors.29 The Cossacks are often praised for their "democratic" tradition as 
compared to the Polish oligarchy and Muscovite autocracy .Most importantly, 
patriotism and loyalty towards a Ukrainian state and Ukrainian culture are 
celebrated in this imagery. 
The life of the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks was reflected in a travel diary first 
published by 1660. Written by a Frenchman, Guillaume le Vasseur de Beauplan, it 
described the Cossacks as a people who 
...greatly value liberty, and would not want to live without it. That is why the 
Cossacks, when they consider themselves to be kept under too tight a rein, 
are so inclined to revolt and rebel against the lords of their country. 
Beyond that, they are faithless people, treacherous, perfidious, and to be 
trusted only with circumspection. They are a very robust people, easily 
enduring heat and cold, hunger and thirst. They are tireless in war, daring, 
courageous, or rather reckless, placing no value on their own lives.^ ^ 
29 o.W. Gems, "Manifestations of the Cossack Idea in Modern History: The Cossack Legacy 
and its Impact", Ukrains'kyi istoryk, no. 1-2 (1986), pp. 22-39. 
Frank Sysyn, "The Reemergence of the Ukrainian Nation and Cossack Mythology" Social 
Research, vol. 58 issue 4 (Winter 1991), pp.845-846. 
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The autonomy of the Cossack state within the Polish lands ended in 1654 after 
a failed uprising of the Cossacks, led by hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi. The signing 
of the Treaty of Pereiaslav in 1654 between the Cossacks and the Russian has 
generated great controversy over its nature and effects. Russian historians 
typically regard the treaty as a long-awaited re-unification of Cossacks and the 
Muscovite state. Ukrainian historians take a different view. They regard it as the 
loss of a separate Cossack state. At the same time, however, they also interpret the 
treaty as one signed on equal terms between two sovereign nations. 
Khmelnytskyi's signing of the treaty is also a subject of considerable controversy. 
The prominent Ukrainian poet, writer, and patriot Taras Shevchenko, condemned 
Khmelnytskyi as being responsible for his people's ''enslavement" under Russia. In 
Russian and Soviet historiography he was praised as the leading figure responsible 
for bringing about the ultimate 'Reunification" of Ukraine and Russia since the fall of 
Kyi van Rus'.^ ^ 
#7- The Cossacks and Women 
The Cossack state was essentially military in nature. Ukrainians glorify the 
Cossacks' military achievements in particular, and their democratic and freedom 
loving characteristics as well. Yet, such a social-political organization did not give 
significant positions to women. Cossack women did not enjoy the same rights as 
men because social status was based upon military ability and fighting skills. In 
these areas women could neither match nor compete with the male Cossacks. 
Women were also prohibited access to the military and administrative 
headquarters. Their subordinate roles remained fixed.^ ^ Certainly women did not 
32 Paul Magosci, A History of Ukraine (Seattle: University of Washington Press) 1996, 
pp.216. 
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have high social status in a military society like the Cossacks. The French traveler 
de Beauplan described Cossack women as open, active and energetic in seeking 
love and marriage with someone they love. He quoted the words of one Cossack 
woman ''proposing" to a man,��you will know how to love your wife and govern her 
well...Your fine qualities lead me to beg you very humbly to accept me as your 
wife".34 Nonetheless, Cossack women's "active participation" appears to have been 
limited to their search for spouses, and did not extend to political or other public 
affairs. Cossack women did appear to accept, to some extent, their subordinate 
position, as suggested by the previous quote. 
Women were largely invisible in representations of the collective memories of 
the Cossacks. There is not a single woman depicted in the paintings of the Cossacks 
(refer to Figure 2 to Figure 4 in the Appendix). The national anthem of present-day 
Ukraine is itself gendered because Ukrainians are ''brothers'' of the Cossacks, but 
there is no place for sisters (�� I will show we are brothers of the Cossack kin"). The 
visualized symbols and images of the Cossacks today are male leaders, male 
warriors, with arms and swords, and male drinkers of alcohol, as shown on current 
Ukrainian paintings, stamps and currency notes. None of these figures include 
females (please refer to Figure 2 to Figure 4 in the Appendix). 
I'll. The Impact of the Cossack Experience 
Influenced by Romanticism, leading Ukrainian historians of the nineteenth 
century, such as Mykola Kostomarov and Mykhailo Maksymovych, generally 
regarded the Cossacks as the progenitors of the democratic and freedom loving 
ideals of the Ukrainians. Kostomarov claimed the Cossacks ''loved neither tsar nor 
pp.184. 
34 Guillaume Le Vasseur, Sieurde Beauplan, Andrew B. Pernal and Dennis F. Essar, (trans.), 
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[Polish] lord ...Cossacks were all equal and free?^ The first modern Ukrainian 
political organization, the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood of the 1840s, published 
the Books of the Genesis of the Ukrainian People [Knyhy Butiia Ukra'inskoho 
Narodu]. In that Book, the Cossacks were regarded as the saviors of the Slavic 
world because of their democratic tradition, which contrasted with the 
authoritarian traditions of their neighbors. ^^  While seeing Kyi van Rus' as 
Ukrainians' national creation, Hrushevskyi believed that the Cossacks embodied 
the best elements of national, cultural and social justice. He acknowledged the 
general Ukrainian perception of the Cossacks as progenitors of the Ukrainian 
national idea and consciousness. 
Today, the ancient symbol, the trident [tryzub], adopted also by the Cossacks, 
is the national symbol. Some of the historical leaders of the Cossacks, like Bohdan 
Khmelnytskyi and Ivan Mazepa, are now on the currency of Ukraine (see Figure 1 
to Figure 4 in the Appendix). They are remembered also in the national anthem:��I 
will show we are brothers of the Cossack k in� [只 NOKAYKCM, _ MM DPARM, 
K03ai4bK0r0 poAV]. Thus Cossack traditions are incorporated into the country's 
national traditions, and help to provide historical legitimacy. Cossack history is 
today understood to represent the proto-Ukrainian state. When Ukrainian male 
nation builders seek a role for women in nation building, they look at this historical 
past for sources of meaning and identity. The Cossack experience is the source that 
provides a positive male tradition for the male nation builders. At the same, it also 
constructs a negative tradition because there was no place for women in the 
military encampment in Cossack state. 
35 Paul Magosci, A History of Ukraine (Seattle: University of Washington Press) 1996, pp.19. 
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The importance of the Cossacks in the hearts of Ukrainians derives not only 
from their excellence in military matters, but also from their love of freedom and 
democracy. However, the historian Linda Gordon has suggested that "the Cossack 
self-government was not democracy but dictatorship tempered by mob 
intervention".37 The Cossack experience may have been romanticized, idealized 
and probably exaggerated. Yet, their symbolic roles in the revival of Ukrainian 
national identity cannot be overlooked. Cossack symbolism, historical leaders, 
dressing style, and military prowess are important tropes of Ukrainian culture 
today. 
IV. Nation Building in Post-Soviet Ukraine 
I. The Needs of Building a Modem Ukrainian Nation 
Ukraine is not a unified, homogenous country. On the contrary, Ukraine is a 
country of great cultural, economic, ethnic and historical diversity. Differences 
between western Ukraine and eastern Ukraine are apparent, as is other regional 
diversity. 
According to Stephen Shulman, the structure of Ukrainian society is��bi-polar". 
Industrial Eastern Ukraine is composed mostly of ethnic Russians or Russified 
Ukrainians who belong to the Eastern Orthodox Church. The inhabitants speak 
mainly Russian. The predominantly agricultural Western region is mainly 
comprised of ethnic Ukrainians of the Ukrainian-Greek-Catholic Church. They 
speak Ukrainian. The Eastern region has been greatly influenced by Russian, and 
later Soviet, culture. The Western region historically was under the rule of Poland 
37 Linda Gordon, Cossack Rebellions: Social Turmoil in the Sixteen-Century Ukraine (Albany: 
State University of New York Press) 1983, pp.83. 
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and later the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is culturally close to these two cultures. 
Region Ethnic Majority Religion Cultural Linguistic Economic 
Association Development 
Eastern Russians, Russified Orthodox Russian & Soviet Russian Industrial 
Ukrainians 
Western Ukrainians Ukrainian- Polish & Ukrainian Agricultural 
[Halychyna Greek- Austro-
or Galicia) Catholic Hungarian 
Figure 1: Bi-polarity of Ukrainian Society: Comparison of the differences 
between the eastern and western Ukraine^® 
Such differences became more apparent and potentially more explosive after 
independence in 1991. If Ukrainians could have their own nation, then why didn't 
other national minorities in Ukraine have the right to their own nation? This is 
particularly problematic because various groups of ethnic minorities live in Ukraine. 
The largest''minority" group is Russian (eleven million people, comprising 22% of 
the population), then Jews (0.9%), Poles (0.5%), Hungarians (0.3%), Germans, 
Finns, Tatars and other ethnic groups (0.5%).^ ^ 
Such ethnic question clearly posed a great threat to the young Ukraine. The 
most obvious force of separatism came from the eastern part of the country, where 
the majority of the Russians reside. 
The heterogeneous nature of Ukraine (and the potential conflicts this presents) 
has stimulated the Ukrainian government to undertake the project of nation 
building. It is currently trying to build a Ukrainian nation with Ukrainian traditions 
38 Stephen Shulman, "The Cultural Foundations of Ukrainian National Identity", Ethnic & 
Racial Studies, vol. 22, (November 1999), pp. 1011-1036. 
39 According to 1989 census. Natsional'nyi sklad naselennia Ukra'fny, p t . l (Kyiv) 1991, 
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36 
and values at the core. Ukrainian nationalism is being promoted as the central 
value of what it means to be a citizen of Ukraine. To build a nation, the Ukrainian 
government selects the elements needed. It emphasizes cultural revival, meaning 
the revival of Ukrainian culture, traditional values, historical memory, and myths. 
By doing so, it seeks to develop a force capable of holding the different ethnic 
groups of the country together. 
Ukraine's internal diversity is further complicated by external affairs. 
Internationally, Ukrainian independence in 1991 was both unexpected. Ukraine's 
invisibility on the international stage was obvious. In 1992, a very limited number 
of western scholars, members of the mass media, and governments accepted that 
Ukraine was an independent and sovereign country. Some of them even viewed 
Ukraine as still a part of Russia. An embarrassing but somewhat telling incident 
involved the former Ukrainian president Kravchuk on a visit to Western Europe in 
the spring of 1992. A leader of another country asked Kravchuk, ''Which part of 
Russia is Ukraine in?"4° Kravchuk was embarrassed. This incident was indicative of 
Ukraine's invisibility on the international stage. 
As a result of diversity at home and invisibility abroad, the Ukrainian 
government is actively engaged in the project of nation building. 
i7- Nation Building As A Project 
It is difficult, even problematic, to try to clearly define the meaning of nation 
building. This is because nation building is a long-term and changing process. 
Walker Connor has argued that the essence of the nation is "psychological" rather 
than ''tangible" and it ''progresses almost without visibility and awareness".斗丄 
40 Quoted in Taras Kuzio, Ukraine: State and Nation Building (London: Routledge) 1998, pp. 
200. 
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Therefore, nation building is a gradual process that re-defines and re-creates 
certain elements that will encourage a loyalty and a shared consciousness, binding 
a previously heterogeneous population together. One of the most important tasks 
of nation building is the construction and re-construction of national identities. 
a. National Identity 
Roman Szorpluk argues that nation building in Ukraine is attempting to redefine 
Ukrainian identity. Taras Kuzio shares a similar view. He comments that the main 
theme of the Ukrainian nation building process i s�� the transfer of these identities to 
an exclusive loyalty to a modern political nation, a transfer which is partially 
dependent upon the socio-economic situation prevailing in Ukraine of identity". 
Nation building here is a top-down movement initiated by the government of 
Ukraine to transform the identities of the residents of Ukraine. Formerly, residents 
might be loyal to the Soviet Union, the regions where they were bom, or regions 
where they reside. The Ukrainian government aims at redirecting these loyalties to 
the Ukrainian central government and state. On the Fifth Anniversary of Ukrainian 
Independence, L. Kuchma discussed Ukraine's nation building, maintaining that it 
��wm transform the naselennia [populace] into a narod [nation] and the territory 
into a state". 
Changing the identity of a population is neither an easy nor quickly 
accomplished task. Indeed, it is a long term and complex process. Anthony Smith 
and Benedict Anderson believe that several key elements are needed to transform 
a naselennia into narod. These elements include a compact territorial unit of 
population, a common history among the population, a common culture, a single 
(April 1972), pp.337, pp.350. 
42 Taras Kuzio, Ukraine: State and Nation Building (London: Routledge) 1998, pp. 4. 
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economy, channels of social communication (especially mass printing), and 
common legal rights and d u t i e s ， S e v e r a l elements contributing to national 
identity are discussed here. The revival of Ukrainian culture, the re-writing of 
history, and historiography, and the building of a collective memory are necessary 
elements to the re-definition of Ukrainian identity. 
b. National History and Historiography 
According to Kuchma, the re-interpretation and re-writing of national history 
forms an important part of the construction and reconstruction of national identity. 
He believes that Ukraine ��needs to revive its genetic memory, a deep 
understanding of one's history" on the Fifth Anniversary of Ukrainian 
independence."^^ He continues the former president Leonid Kravchuk's project of 
historicizing Ukrainians' national identity by giving Ukrainians a national identity 
separate from Russians — a separate national history and a unique national 
mythos. 
The main theme of post-Soviet Ukrainian history is the country's continuous 
struggles for national liberation and an independent state. The Ukrainian navy 
newspaper comments that Ukrainian struggle for independence was ''through the 
blood and sacrifices of thousands of Ukrainian patriots who gave up their lives for 
l i b e r a t i o n � . 4 6 The Defense Minster also offered a similar opinion, stating that 
Ukrainian independence is a result of��centurjes of dreams and the self-sacrificing 
44 Anthony D. Smith, ''Ethnic Identity and Territorial Nationalism in Comparative 
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struggle of many generations of Ukrainian p a t r i o t s " " 
Ukrainian national history and historiography are both based on Mykhailo 
Hrsuhevskyi's historical schema. Hrushevskyi himself plays a dual role in Ukrainian 
history. He is not only a prominent Ukrainian historian but also a national figure 
who symbolizes the devotion to an independent Ukraine and Ukrainian culture. He 
was officially nationalized as one of the three Ukrainian state builders on Ukraine's 
fifth anniversary of independence in 1996, together with Volodymyr the Great and 
Yaloslav the Wise. 
According to Mykhailo Hrushevskyi's representation of Ukrainian history, the 
Ukrainian ethnic nation [natsiia] originated from an ethno-cultural group that has 
been enriched by a thousand-year history dating back to the great state of Kyi van 
Rus'_ Yet, the aggression and exploitation of Russian imperialism, since the Treaty 
of Pereiaslav in 1654, consistently frustrated Ukrainian ambitions for statehood. As 
a result of these controversial interpretations of key historical events and figures, 
Ukrainian-Russian relations are depicted as unhappy and oppressive from the 
Ukrainian point of vjew,8 The experience under the regime of the Soviet Union is 
thus seen as a continuation of Russian-centered cultural and economic colonialism. 
Therefore, Ukrainian independence in 1991 was depicted as the long-awaited 
fulfillment of the dream of democracy and freedom inherent in Ukrainian culture. 
c. Mythical Structure of Ukrainian Nationhood 
Based upon a somewhat simplified version of Hrushevskyi's historical schema, 
Ukrainian nationhood is built upon a set of myths stretching from the myth of 
foundation to the myth of suffering and colonialism. These myths need not be true 
47 Radio Ukraine World Service, 24 August 1996. 
48 Kataryna Wolczuk, "History, Europe and the "National Idea": the "Official" Narrative of 
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to be both powerful and unquestioned, as Roland Barthes has noted，They 
occupy a special position among citizens of a nation in the making. 
Foundation Mvth, Mvth of a Golden Aae and Mvth of Descent 
In the new post-Soviet Ukrainian historiography, Kyi van Rus' is regarded as the 
foundation of the Ukrainian nation, the first Ukrainian nation. This is the foundation 
myth of Ukrainian nationhood. 
Kyi van Rus' is regarded as one of the greatest and most civilized states of the 
medieval period. Its' cultural, architectural, and literary achievements were 
extraordinary. It is for these reasons that the Kyi van state serves as a potent 
foundation myth of the golden age in Ukrainian nation building. After the invasion 
of the Mongols in 1240, 1416 and 1418, the great state weakened and never 
recovered its former glory. The first ''Partition of Ukraine" began with the sack of 
Kyiv by the Mongols and then the state was divided among various princes， 
Ukraine's national history continued with the rising of the Cossacks as a direct 
revival of the tradition of the Kyi van Rus'. The myth of descent is continued through 
the Cossack experience.^丄 Thus, a genealogical link is formed; Kyi van Rus' is 
regarded as the original Ukrainian state, the Cossack state as the revival, and 
Ukraine today is the final resurgence. 
Mvth of Aggression, Mvth of Colonialism, Mvth of Suffering and Mvth of Empire 
The myth of historical aggression and exploitation stretches from the Treaty of 
49 Roland Barthes, Annette Lavers (sel. & trans.), Mythologies (New York: Hill and Wang) 
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the Pereiaslav to the Soviet Era. Instead of adhering to the "Little Russian" 
stereotype of the''voluntary" inclusion within the Russian Empire, the absorption is 
viewed as the beginning of the entire period of struggle for national liberation.^^ 
The Romanov dynasty and the Soviet regime were both described as��empires" and 
thus Ukraine as their ''internal colony", was subject to colonial exploitation and 
forced Russification. 
Post-Soviet interpretations of Ukrainian experiences under the Soviet regime 
generally portray Ukrainians as victims, which differs greatly from the official 
interpretations before 1991. The Famine of 1932-1934, the victims of Stalin's 
repressions, and the tragedy of Chernobyl constitute much of the mythos of 
suffering and victimization. These three tragedies are used to illustrate the apathy 
of the Soviet regime to Ukraine SSR and to Ukrainians, who were merely regarded 
as a small and unimportant screw in the big machine of socialism. 
It has, in fact, been shown by other scholars that the Russian Republic was a 
net exporter to and supporter of Ukraine SSR. Despite the fact that Ukrainian SSR 
was a major agricultural and industrial producer in the Soviet Union, it was also a 
net importer of cheap energy from Russia. ^ ^ Nonetheless, these myths are 
important elements in Ukrainian nationhood. They are the supporting structures 
that uphold the whole long history of Ukraine's ''national liberation" movement. 
d. Revival of Ukrainian Culture 
The revival of Ukrainian culture as a national culture is an obvious task. It is also 
an important part of the nation building project. 
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Ukrainian culture had previously been considered merely local or rural during 
the Soviet regime. Ukrainian language, for example, was considered to be only a 
dialect of Russian, a local language spoken by local folks. Ukrainian culture was 
viewed as a peasant folk culture inferior to Russian high culture. Ukrainians were 
Little Russians. This situation changed after 1991. Ukrainian culture is no longer 
marginalized. It has been elevated to a national culture and the dominant culture of 
the Ukrainian nation. Ukrainian language is now the official language, as confirmed 
by the Constitution of 1996. This has created problems given the fact that the 
Russian language has been commonly used by the many Russians in Ukraine, 
Russified Ukrainians, and other Ukrainians because of the intense Russificiation 
process during the nineteenth and the twentieth century. 
It is worth noting that the current teaching of Ukrainian language focuses on 
distinguishing between Ukrainian and Russian words, including identifying the 
origins of different words as e i t h e r � � U k r a i n i a n � or��Russian".54 The differentiation of 
Ukrainian culture from Russian culture is a primary aim. 
e. Collective Memory 
Scholars believe that collective memory is a central component of national 
identity. The loss of collective memory devastates national consciousness. Anthony 
Smith believes that memory is very crucial in making-up national identity. He adds 
that''one might almost say: no memory, no identity, no identity, no nation".^ ^ The 
nation is built upon common memories of sufferings, glories, and most of all, 
sacrifices, a notion reflected in the words of the Defense Minister of Ukraine above. 
54 This was my experience at Harvard Summer School while I was studying Ukrainian. 
Whenever the instructor taught a new word, the stress was whether the word comes from 
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Smith also comments that in regard to battles, defeats are no less important than 
victories for ''mobilizing and unifying ethnies and nations". ^^  Building and 
re-creating collective memories is obviously an important and critical task for elites 
in post-Soviet Ukraine.^^ Collective memories are important and vital to Ukraine 
and Ukrainians. This can be illustrated by the fact that the Russian Empress 
Catherine ordered that historical memories of the period of the hetmans be erased 
in 1764 when she abolished the hetmanate in order to transform the identities of 
hetmans into Little Russians.^® 
Post-Soviet Ukraine's re-creation of collective memory depends upon the 
central imagery of victimization of Ukraine under the regimes of Imperial Russia 
and the Soviet Union. The shared memories of sufferings are expressed in various 
re-interpretations of historical events. The main cause of Ukrainian sufferings and 
unhappiness was Russia's imperialism and the Soviet Union's forced socialism, 
which not only enslaved the Ukrainian people but also destroyed their 
freedom-loving tradition. The Treaty of Pereiaslav of 1654 turned Ukraine into a 
colony of Imperial Russia. Ukraine and Ukrainians suffered from economic 
exploitation, political oppression, cultural discrimination and Russification since 
that time. The coming of Communism to Ukraine was also forced and illegal. 
The ''socialist choice" of the people of Ukraine was historically illegal 
[nepravomirnyi]. Who knows the history of 1917-1920 realizes that we had 
the Ukrainian National Republic [Uk ram ska Narodna Respublyka] and West 
Ukrainian National Republic [Zakhidno-Ukralnska Narodna 
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Respublyka].. Jh\s was the choice of our people. After this there was only 
annexation and aggression.^^ 
The Famine of 1933 in Ukraine was the most obvious expression of suffering 
and exploitation. The Famine was, in fact, a great tragedy to Ukraine and 
Ukrainians in terms of human loss. It is estimated that the Great Famine of 1933 
cost four and a half million to five million human lives in 1933 alone, while the 
death toll might rise to ten million for the rest of the 1 9 3 0 s . A witness who was 
sent to Ukraine to help implement collectivization described the devastation there. 
There was no grain to eat..No bread...They [the Soviet officials] had taken 
every last kernel of grain from the village. There was no seed to be sown for 
spring wheat or other spring grains. The entire seed fund had been 
confiscated..There was no help. The party officials had one answer to all 
entreaties: You should work harder; you shouldn't have loafed. 
In post-Soviet Ukraine, history textbooks emphasize Ukrainian sufferings. The 
apathy of the Communist Party and the Soviet officials are seriously condemned as 
the main cause of the Famine.^^ The sufferings were also commemorated in 
stamps to remind the people of Ukraine that their great-grandfather, 
great-grandmothers, grandfathers, grandmothers, fathers, mothers, relatives, and 
friends might have suffered from the Great Famine. It is a critical part of the 
collective memory. 
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Bahriany Foundation) c l983, pp.92-96. Quoted in Paul Magosci, A History of Ukraine 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press) 1996, pp. 561. 
62 Catherine Wanner, The Burden of Dreams: Post-Soviet National Identity in Ukraine 
(University Park, Perm.: Pennsylvania State University Press), 1998, pp. 94-95. 
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Another part of the collective memory is the Chernobyl tragedy. The Chernobyl 
disaster still haunts the people of Ukraine and indeed the world. It is estimated that 
about three million people were affected. Nonetheless, the Chernobyl accident is 
not openly condemned in history textbooks as is the Great Famine. This was largely 
because the nuclear power generated by the Chernobyl plant is still required to 
light Kyiv and other cities in Ukraine. Although the Ukrainian government promised 
to close Chernobyl by December 2000, and did so, the nuclear plant still served as 
a cheap source of electricity after the establishment of the Ukrainian state. 
Therefore, the accident is just mentioned in textbooks with a few comments on the 
causes. 
V. Conclusion 
Given the fact that Ukraine had never had its own state, independence in 1991 
was indeed historic to many Ukrainians. However, as independent Ukraine is 
''diverse at home and invisible abroad", the Ukrainian government has been 
compelled to launch the nation building project. This project is aimed at 
transforming the national identities of its heterogeneous citizens into a Ukrainian 
national identity capable of holding the nation together. Yet, transformation of 
identities is not an easy or over-night task. It requires the rewriting of national 
history, the revival of Ukrainian culture as the national culture, and the building of 
collective memory. These elements may, in time, help construct a unified identity. 
Gender is not openly visible in all these elements. Nevertheless, the idealization 
of the Cossack experience as foundational to the national context of the present 
day is indeed deeply gendered, as illustrated above. 
63 Catherine Wanner, The Burden of Dreams: Post-Soviet National Identity in Ukraine 
(University Park, Perm.: Pennsylvania State University Press) 1998, pp. 98-101. 
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Chapter 3: Gender. Nation and the cult of Berehvnia 
I. Introduction 
Ukrainian nationalism has been a crucial factor in the making of government 
policy because the Ukrainian government is consciously and actively cultivating it 
with the aim of holding the heterogeneous country together and turning it into a 
unified and harmonious nation state. Frequently, the project is presented as being 
in the interests of all the people in Ukraine, and therefore all should participate in 
it. Nonetheless, the interests of women are frequently ignored, and their positions 
and their roles within the nation are defined by the male leaders of the project. Any 
''Ukrainian nation" that does not consider the interests of women, who make up 
slightly more than half of the Ukrainian population, will be incomplete and 
restricted. 
In this chapter, I seek to engender the project of nation building in Ukraine by 
analyzing how the Ukrainian leaders define the roles of men and women, as well as 
how they depict the contributions of women to the national project. In fact, men 
and women in Ukraine are placed differently in the so-called national (but indeed a 
male-oriented and male-defined) project. In this nation-building project, 
contributions and responsibilities are allocated according to gender. Moreover, the 
interests and needs of men and women are weighted and valued differently and 
thus addressed in different ways, and perhaps, most importantly, at different times. 
A frequent theme of the Ukrainian leaders is that women's liberation must be 
delayed because the nation must first be fully liberated. 
The contemporary appeals made to Ukrainian women to subordinate their 
interests and needs to the goals of national struggle are not new. They echo similar 
appeals in the late nineteenth century in Galicia where feminism first emerged. 
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Feminism did not develop independently. Rather it emerged and developed in the 
shadow of a suppressed national movement for autonomy and independence. Thus, 
the first section of this chapter will explore this early encounter of nationalism and 
feminism in Ukraine. This encounter significantly shaped the evolution of feminism 
in Ukraine. In the late nineteenth century, as in the twenty-first, Ukrainian women 
were urged to subordinate their interests and needs to the national cause. In the 
past, as in the present, women responded to the call. 
The second section of this chapter focuses on the revitalized present goal of 
building a modern Ukrainian nation. Today, Ukraine is an independent country. 
Nonetheless, Ukrainian women are still being asked to put aside their personal 
desires for the nation building project. 
Central to Ukrainian nation builders' conception of the''Ukrainian woman" is the 
ancient Slav pagan goddess Berehynia. Her characteristics are idealized and 
redefined to fit into the context of the current Ukrainian nation building project. 
She has become the model for Ukrainian women. Today, she appears in various 
forms of art, and in both popular culture and high culture, in order to appeal to 
Ukrainian women of different backgrounds. Berehynia is now used to represent far 
more than she did originally. Therefore, in the third section of this chapter I 
examine the historical roots and original meanings of this goddess. 
The cult of Berehynia became overwhelming popular after a Ukrainian 
ethnographer, Vasyl Skurativskyi, published Berehynia in 1988. The book is 
responsible for the revival of this cult. Therefore, in the fourth section, I aim to 
explore the two main ideas of the book and its link to the revival of the cult of 
Berehynia. 
Originally, Berehynia was the goddess of fertility and protection. Now, she is 
bearing far more than her original duties. Today, she is praised by Ukrainians for 
48 
her appreciation of Ukrainian culture, her active role in the preservation and the 
transmitting of Ukrainian language, her devotion to domesticity and child nurturing, 
and her role as the ideal hearth mother. Thus, the fifth section investigates the 
emphases and redefinitions of the roles and characteristics of Berehynia and how 
they fit into the context of the Ukrainian nation-building project. In other words, 
this section examines how these roles and characteristics are redefined to 
accommodate the present needs. 
The last section of this chapter analyzes Ukrainian women's gendered national 
duties. Women are urged to produce more children and to nurture children with 
Ukrainian culture and traditional values for the nation. This section also explores 
men's national duties. While motherhood defines women's national duties, 
leadership and decision making are men's duties in the nation building project. Part 
of men's role is then to decide and define national gender roles. 
II.Feminism and Nationalism: Historical Acquaintance 
Feminism^ did not develop independently in Ukraine. It has served the national 
cause since the nineteenth century, when discussions of women's interests and 
women's rights first emerged in Galicia (part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at 
that time). The totalizing effect of nationalism and the ''need" to struggle for 
independence influenced the discourse on gender and women's issues. They were 
deemed less important than the overall national project, and thus were not 
prioritized. 
In her book Feminists Despite Themselves, Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak 
1 There is no single definition of the term Feminism. Here, I adopt the generalized definition 
Chomiak uses in her book, as referring it to women's emancipation, women's rights, and 
equality between sexes in both public and private spheres. 
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argues that when female activists in Galicia formed their own organizations to 
advocate the emancipation of women in the late nineteenth century, they indeed 
worked for the sake of the nation. Implicitly, their ultimate goal was to help in 
expelling foreign rule in Ukraine and to establish a Ukrainian state. These women's 
organizations focused on work promoting education and charitable jobs for the 
weak and the poor. Thus, these female activists defined the nature of their work as 
a self-help movement working for the well-being of the community. The majority of 
women involved regarded their ultimate task as assisting in the national struggle.^ 
One common and widely accepted idea was that women could not be liberated until 
the nation was liberated. Women's goals were subordinated ''to those of the nation 
or the prevalent ideology".^ 
Natalia Kobrynska, a prominent female Ukrainian activist, opposed the 
subordination of women's interests and promoted the public roles of women. 
Despite her efforts, her ideas were not accepted by men or by women. Feminist 
consciousness was weak among even the majority of female intellectuals of the 
time/ To men, feminist activism and their advocacy challenged men's superiority. 
From that time onward, they opposed the feminist movement, and indeed a hatred 
of feminism and the feminist movement was common to most men. Feminist 
demands found equally little support from women.^ Lesia Ukrainka (1871-1913), 
the best-known Ukrainian female activist, is largely praised by Ukrainians not 
1 Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, Feminists Despite Themselves: Women in Ukrainian 
Community Life, 1884-1939 (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University 
of Alberta) 1988, pp. xix. 
3 Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, Feminists Despite Themselves: Women in Ukrainian 
Community Life, 1884-1939 (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University 
of Alberta) 1988, pp. xx-xxi, pp. xix. 
4 Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, Feminists Despite Themselves: Women in Ukrainian 
Community Life, 1884-1939 (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University 
of Alberta) 1988, pp. 71-85. 
5 Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, Feminists Despite Themselves: Women in Ukrainian 
Community Life, 1884-1939 (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University 
of Alberta) 1988, pp. 37. 
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because she was a female writer, but because of her active engagement in the 
Ukrainian struggle for independence. There was no market for feminism. There was 
only one for nationalism. 
The historical background of the relationship between nationalism and 
feminism illustrates certain important concepts. First, these two ideas weighed 
differently among Ukrainians; nationalism was ranked first while feminism was 
ranked far below. In addition, feminism served a common national cause. The 
over-arching effect of nationalism, a phenomenon also illustrated in the experience 
of modern Indian nationalism, can be seen clearly here. Second, feminism and the 
feminist movement were instrumental to the national cause. The charitable works 
these female activists engaged in also served certain functions for nationalism. 
Ukrainian female activists did not see the need for an independent women's 
movement, for they too believed that women could not be liberated if the country 
was not liberated first. The priority was clear. Unfortunately, national liberation 
does not guarantee the liberation of women. 
In fact, only a small number of women were aware of the Ukrainian national 
movement and an even smaller number participated in this movement in Galicia. 
This was primarily because few women were educated, and also because the 
Ukrainian national movement in the nineteenth century was a movement initiated 
and supported by male intellectual and elites. 
The National-populist society Prosvita was formed in 1868. Its formation 
benefited from the informal autonomy that was granted to ethnic minorities as a 
result of the reconstruction policy of the Hapsburg Empire. Yet, the power to 
6 John-Paul Himka, Galician Villages and the Ukrainian National Movement in the NinctGenth 
Century, (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press in association with the Canadian Institute of 
Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta) 1988, pp. xxii. 
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exercise this informal autonomy was granted to various nobles of the Magyars, 
Poles, and Ukrainians. Ukrainians were the most disadvantaged in this regard, 
because Ukrainians were part of the Polish section and thus Polish nobles 
dominated all institutions that grew out of this informal autonomy. Despite such 
difficulties, Ukrainians did form Prosvita which started to publish a newspaper 
called Batkivshchyna in 1879. The name was a Ukrainian word meaning 
''patrimony'' and ' ' f a t he r l and " / Obviously, the national movement had a gender. 
In order to foster literacy among peasants, the Prosvita established reading 
clubs with a national orientation in Galicia. Members of reading clubs were of 
various backgrounds. Among them were priests, teachers, writers, and cantors. 
Intellectual women and girls were also members of these readings clubs with an 
overwhelming proportion being young girls. Yet, the total number of women was 
very limited, largely due to the traditional stereotypes of women in the minds of 
Ukrainian men. Traditionally, Ukrainian men considered women as intellectually 
inferior. An old Ukrainian proverb described women having long hair but short 
intellects.8 Women were second-class citizens in an agricultural society such as in 
Galicia; they also remained second-class members in the reading clubs. The 
hostility of national populists reflected the ��sexism of Galician Ukrainian 
intelligentsia". Only men had the franchise in national matters; women were 
largely excluded. 
7 :)ohn-Paul Himka, Galician Villages and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth 
Century, (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press in association with the Canadian Institute of 
Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta) 1988, pp.69. 
8 John-Paul Himka, Galician Villages and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth 
Century, (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press in association with the Canadian Institute of 
Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta) 1988, pp. 101. 
9 John-Paul Himka, Galician Villages and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth 
Century, (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press in association with the Canadian Institute of 
Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta) 1988, pp. 102. 
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III.Revitalized Present Goal 
Now Ukraine is an independent and sovereign country; the long hoped for goal 
of independence has been achieved. Women should be able to liberate themselves 
because the country is already liberated. In post-Soviet Ukraine, however, this is 
not the case. The priority given to ''nation" over��women" continues to exist and is 
even being intensified and revitalized. Present efforts are concentrated on the 
ongoing project of constructing a modern Ukrainian nation. Once again, Ukrainian 
women are being asked to serve the national cause. Women's interests are totally 
subsumed and subordinated to this project. Women's issues remain secondary and 
unimportant. Ironically, women cannot yet liberate themselves even though the 
country has been liberated. Very often, women's interests are the first to be 
ignored if sacrifices and concessions must be made. The term ''feminism" remains 
suspect in the minds of most Ukrainian women and men today^° just as it was a 
century ago. Moreover, feminism is now associated with the West and Western 
values. The argument is that Ukraine must recover its traditions and traditional 
values. Therefore, for Ukrainians, feminism offers nothing constructive and is 
certain to contaminate��pure" Ukrainian values.^^ 
Ironically, such prioritizing and thinking is common even among the leaders of 
Ukrainian women's organizations. Oksana Sapeliak, the president of the Lviv 
branch of the Ukrainian Women's Union, an independent women's organization, 
said on the eve of independence that women would have to liberate the nation 
before they could liberate themselves.丄之 The national president of the same 
10 Sincere thanks to the author. Marian Rubchak, "Women's Issues in Ukraine: Past and 
Present", unpublished, pp. 3 
n Solomea Pavlychko, "Between Feminism and Nationalism", in Mary Buckley (ed。)， 
Perestroika and Soviet Women (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press) 1992, 
pp. 82-90. 
12 ukramka, 3 (30) 1995, pp.3. Quoted in Marian Rubchak, "Women's Issues in Ukraine. 
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organization, Atena Pashko, commented,��the fate of Ukraine is inseparable from 
the fate of women". The Union further defines the roles of women in its Statute: 
For centuries a Ukrainian woman was the guardian {Berehynia) of the home 
hearth, took care of the customs of the ancestors, national language, 
morality, ethnos, education, and culture, and participated in the struggle 
for the high ideals of Ukrainian statehood” 
The main aim of the organization is to promote the national consciousness and 
spirituality of women in Ukraine "^^ . Atena Pashko also has referred to Ukrainian 
women as the ''guardians of the family hearth...Berehynia''.^^ 
In analyzing pronouncements about the revitalized goals of the present 
day—building a modern Ukrainian nation, I find the constant appearance and 
promotion of the ancient Slav goddess, Berehynia. The Ukrainian government 
promotes many of the attributes adhering to this mythical woman when it redefines 
the national duties of its female citizens. Very often, Berehynia's imagined 
characteristics at home and her imagined attitudes towards Ukrainian culture 
dominate the discourse. This campaign has been successful, as the cult of 
Berehynia is increasingly popular among women and is becoming accepted as 
manifesting the necessary characteristics of a Ukrainian woman. Berehynia is very 
appealing. 
Past and Present", unpublished, pp. 3. Sincere thanks to the author. 
13 Solomea Pavlychko, ''Between Feminism and Nationalism", in Mary Buckley (ed.), 
Perestroika and Soviet Women (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press) 1992, 
pp. 91. 
14 Solomea Pavlychko, "Between Feminism and Nationalism'； in Mary Buckley (ed.), 
Perestroika and Soviet Women (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press) 1992, 
pp. 91. 
15 Ukra'fnka, 2 (26) 1994, pp.4. Quoted in Marian Rubchak, "Women's Issues in Ukraine. 
Past and Present", unpublished, pp. 3. Sincere thanks to the author. 
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IV. Berehynia: The Perfect Ukrainian Woman 
I. History 
Berehynia was a Slav pagan goddess who was worshipped for centuries. The 
first known historical record of the worship of Berehynia appears in the work of the 
Byzantine historian Procopius in the sixth century. He described Slavs' worship of 
trees, lakes and riverbanks called "Beregina�.i6 According to both Joanna Hubbs^^ 
and Martha Ann,��Bereginy" are,��fertility and hunting goddesses" and��nymphs of 
rivers, lakes and forests. Portrayed as half woman, half bird or half fish�.i8 Other 
evidence shows that she was worshipped before and even after the coming of 
Christianity in the late tenth century in Kyi van Rus'. 
Historically, materials indicate that the popular cult of protectress was 
widespread. Images of Berehynia can be found in ancient stones and ceramic 
figurines, metal and later in ritual towels in folk arts.^ ^ Jewelry of the sixth century 
shows Berehynia listening to snakes or sometimes holding them. Snakes were 
protective forces, believed to assist in births and were highly valued. They were 
also bearers of good fortune. Berehynia is also associated with rusalki (��msalky" in 
Ukrainian) who are female creatures, water spirits, and insurers of female 
fertility.?�In Ukrainian, Berehynia's name comes from the word��berehty" meaning 
to ''protect". Therefore, Berehynia represents two notions: fertility and protection. 
Berehynia became the major fertility goddess (see Figure 5 and Figure 6 in the 
16 Procopius, H. B. Dewing (trans.), History of Wars (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press) 1924, vol. 4, pp. 270-271. 
17 Joanna Hubbs, Mother Russia: the Feminine Myth in Russian Culture (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press) 1988, pp. 16. 
18 Martha Ann, Dorothy Myers Imel, Goddesses in World Mythology (Santa Barbara, Calif.: 
ABC-CLIO) 1993, pp.44. 
19 EJ.W. Barber, "On the Origins of vily/rusaiki". Varia on the Indo-European Past: Papers in 
Memory of Marija Gimbuta, Journal of Indo-European Studies, monograph 19 (1997), pp. 
21. 
20 EJ.W. Barber ,��0n the Origins of vily/rusaiki: Varia on the Indo-European Past: Papers in 
Memory of Marija Gimbuta, Journal of Indo-European Studies, monograph 19 (1997), pp. 6. 
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Appendix) in the eighth century. After the coming of Christianity in 988, Berehynia 
was allowed to remain as an agricultural symbol and thus she continued to exist in 
Ukrainian culture. 
II, Development 
Berehynia has been a consistent figure throughout the history of the Ukrainians. 
She has remained one of the major goddesses. Collections of peasant folk 
costumes in various museums in Russia and Ukraine show that Berehynia is the 
center of these collections. Berehynia remains an essential religious figure to many 
families in Ukraine's rural areas. Research shows that the images of Berehynia are 
found on handmade embroideries, vests, and women's folk costumes in many 
households in Kyiv, Lviv and other areas (see Figure 5 to Figure 7 in the 
Appendix).21 
III. Revival 
Today, Berehynia symbolizes the cliched traditional roles of women in the family 
as wives and mothers. She appears as the idealized figure guiding Ukrainian 
women to recognize and accept their proper gender roles. She is the perfect 
Ukrainian woman and the example Ukrainian women are urged to follow. 
The cult of Berehynia became overwhelming popular after the publication of the 
book Berehynia by Ukrainian ethnographer Vasyl Skurativskyi in 1987.22 vasyl 
Skurativskyi specializes in Ukrainian ethnographic research. He was educated at 
Kyiv University and worked as a journalist in a district newspaper. Skurativskyi has 
authored various ethnographic books and has edited some journals including the 
book Berehynia and the journal of the same title. 
21 Mary B. Kelly, Goddess Embroideries of Eastern Europe (New York: Studiobooks) 1996, pp. 
8. 
22 Vasyl Skurativskyi, Berehynia (Kyiv: Radianskyi Pysmennyk) 1987. 
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In Berehynia, Skurativskyi describes Ukrainian folk culture and peasant 
traditions. He also gives various colorful illustrations of rural life: peasant houses, 
rural crafts, traditional towels and pillow with embroidery, and folk costumes. He 
appreciates rural life and urges people not only to preserve it but also to follow its 
customs and traditions. He presents two main ideas in his book. Firstly, it is 
necessary to preserve and restore Ukrainian folk and peasant culture. The peasant 
family's hierarchical structure, which is essentially patriarchal, must be revived. 
Ukrainian matriarchy is insignificant. Secondly, cultural values must be transmitted 
from generation to generation. All these ideas are closely associated with the 
author's understanding of Berehynia, the ancient pagan goddess. 
As a Ukrainian ethnographer interested in Ukraine's ethnographic research, 
Skurativskyi focuses on Ukraine's lost peasant culture. His main aim is to recall the 
folk culture and to urge people to preserve it, because he believes that Ukrainian 
traditional peasant culture has been lost under the regime of the Soviet Union 
during which industrialization was the main theme. Moreover, as a result of 
urbanization, many people moved to urban cities from villages and left behind their 
peasant cultural values. Therefore, Skurativskyi aims at awakening the Ukrainian 
people who have already forgotten the Ukrainian peasant culture. He comments 
that the majority of village women are mothers, and yet they have lost their 
consciousness [to folk culture] in their manual labor work. 23 He also condemns the 
modern Ukrainian women who do not even know how to sing traditional Ukrainian 
folk songs or how to make embroidery. He also disapproves of the shift in women's 
domestic duties due to work in industry. Therefore, it is his aim to recall the duties 
and responsibilities of women and mothers. 24 According to the author, Berehynia 
23 Vasyl Skurativskyi, Berehynia (Kyiv: Radianskyi Pysmennyk) 1987, pp. 3. 
24 Vasyl Skurativskyi, Berehynia (Kyiv: Radianskyi Pysmennyk) 1987, pp. 3. 
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exemplifies the best of folk culture and traditional values. She remains the center 
of both hearth and home. 
a. Peasant Hierarchical Family Structure 
The peasant family is patriarchal and hierarchal in nature. Obedience is 
another main theme that emerges when Skurativskyi analyzes the peasant family 
structure. Yet, obedience is structured according to age and gender — children 
should obey parents, and wives are subordinate to their husbands. 
Peasant women in his book appear to be mostly obedient, submissive, loving, 
and caring. Their naturalized subordination to men is also shown in pictures. For 
example, Figure 9 in the Appendix shows the cover of this book. The peasant 
woman appears obedient, loving, beautiful, and feminine (see Figure 8 and Figure 
9 in the Appendix). The apples in her hands symbolize her care for family and 
fertility. She is also dressed in traditional folk costume, illustrating her love for 
traditional values.^ ^ Furthermore, other peasant women show their appreciation 
towards the hierarchy in family as well as to the folk culture. The author thus 
affirms not only the domestic nature of women's roles, as exemplified by Berehynia, 
but also the subordination of women at home. The book talks about the revival of 
folk culture and the family patriarchal hierarchy. The promotion of folk culture 
implicitly calls for the return of the subordination of women, including a return to 
domesticity. 
b. Generation Fires 
The transfer of cultural values and traditions from generations to generations is 
definitely a main theme in Skurativskyi's book. Women play a vital role in the 
transfer of these values. Usually, these values would be passed from mothers to 
25 Vasyl Skurativskyi, Berehynia (Kyiv: Radianskyi Pysmennyk) 1987, coven 
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daughters and grandmothers to granddaughters, so that generational fires could 
be maintained and traditional cultural values could be preserved. Interestingly, the 
author also shows pictures of grandmothers, daughters and granddaughters in one 
picture suggesting the transmission of traditional values, the precious cultural lore 
being passed from one generation to another (see Figure 10 in the Appendix).^^ 
iV- Emphases and Redefinitions 
Currently, Berehynia is a popular traditional figure occupying places in various 
forms of arts designed to appeal to both those interested in popular culture and 
high culture. She was Christianized and thus, she is able to remain in Ukrainian 
culture. 
High culture representations include the work of the poet Vasyl Ruban, who has 
published his romantic poem Berehynia: An Historical Novel. Her story and 
characteristics are praised in literature, texts, and poems, including Ruban's 
romantic poems published in 1992.^ ^ Vasyl Skurativskyi also established a monthly 
journal called Berehynia in 1992. The journal has drawn a great variety of papers 
and articles contributed by university scholars, writers, historians, and 
cartographers. Articles in the series of journal are related to Ukraine's history, map 
drawings and definitions, folk culture, literature and more. His goal is to draw 
attention from people of various walks of life. Moreover, Berehynia appears in 
Ukrainian folk theatre, and is part of the name one of Ukraine's most prestigious 
colleges. 
In regard to popular culture, Berehynia's images appear on p y s a n k y , the 
26 Solomea Pavlychko, "Between Feminism and Nationalism", in Mary Buckley (ed.), 
Perestroika and Soviet Women (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press) 1992, 
pp. 82-90. 
27 Vasyl Ruban, Berehynia: istorychnyi roman (Kyiv:Ukrainskyj Pysmennyk) 1992. 
28 Pysankarstvo is a type of Ukrainian folk art meaning painting on eggs. See 
http://www.artukraine.com/eqa/Dvsankv fam.htm and 
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Ukrainian Easter eggs. Her images are painted on textiles and tapestries (see 
Figure 11 in the Appendix). Her name titles music festivals, folk festivals, radio 
programs, and a women organization.^^ She appears in sculptures representing a 
caring and nurturing mother who protects her children from all sorts of ha rm. 
Berehynia is glorified and celebrated on the eighth of September.^^ She is also 
standing far above the ground in the main street of Lviv.^ ^ Berehynia has become 
a powerful symbol carrying and transmitting messages and a deeply gendered 
national ideology. She is the ideal mother, the perfect Ukrainian woman, and the 
ultimate ambition of all Ukrainian women. 
Berehynia is now used for far more that what she originally represented. She is 
idealized, nationalized and reconfigured to fit the context of the modern Ukrainian 
nation building. Several associations with this goddess and various characters are 
derived from the origin. She represents particular nationalized duties appealing to 
Ukrainian women. 
a. Fertility 
The old association of Berehynia with fertility is now particularly stressed. 
Figure 9 in the Appendix shows a woman who is holding apples, which are 
associated with fertility. Given the fact that post-Soviet Ukraine has experienced a 
sharp fall in fertility and depopulation (please refer to chapter four for details), the 
government of Ukraine wants women to produce more children. Berehynia thus fits 
http://www.artukraine.com/eqq/pvsankvpl.htm. 
29 Taisa Kosenko, Berehynia Ukrainy. Za Materia la my radio prohramy dlia zhinok 'Berehyni' 
Keiva shcho zvuchaly v efiri 'mystetstvo‘ protiahom 1991-1994 rokiv (Kyiv: Mystetstvo) 
1995. 
3° Children of Chernobyl Relief Fund Newsletter, vol. xvi, summer 1999, p. 1. A bronze 
sculpture of the "Berehynia" (the protectress) was presented to Hillary Rodham Clinton by 
the Fund which dep i c t s��a tr ditional icon-like image of a mother holding a child with 
outstretched arms". See also http://www.childrenofchornobvl.orq/hrclinton.htm. 
31 September also celebrates the Sports Day and the Nativity of Mary. See 
httD://www.nas.com/ipcolbertart/seasons/septdavsl.html#sports. 
32 The Den, www.dav.kiev.ua/DIGEST/2001/31/sport/spl.htm 
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neatly into the cliched belief that women are the nation's live givers and creators, 
and serves contemporary national needs. Apart from just giving birth, Ukrainian 
women are also urged to teach and nurture their offspring with Ukrainian culture. 
This means that they have not only to be mothers, but also have to be good 
reproducers of the national culture. Both kinds of reproduction are supported by 
powerful Berehynia imagery. 
b. Guardian/Protectress 
Berehynia means protectress or guardian. She is now not only protecting 
fertility and the domestic hearth, but also guarding Ukrainian culture, traditional 
values, language and the Ukrainian nation. Essentially, she is shielding pure 
Ukrainian values from the ''contaminating'' effects of Western values. Certainly, 
such a��protectress" role has several implications. As Ukraine is actively reviving its 
culture, it is important for these cultural values to be accepted by the common 
Ukrainian people. Nonetheless, the import of Western values is increasing, and 
having an impact on many Ukrainian people, particularly young people. ^^  
Therefore, it is in the interest of the Ukrainian government to act antagonistically 
towards the coming of Western values. 
V. Gendered National Duties 
The government of Ukraine enthusiastically pushes the cult of Berehynia and 
her characteristics as an ideal mother, a protectress, and a responsible citizen who 
loves Ukrainian language, culture and traditional values. On various occasions, 
officers of the government urge women to adopt Berehynia's characteristics 
33 See Solomea Pavlychko, "Progress on Hold: the Conservative Faces of Ukrainian Women", 
in Mary Buckley (ed.)/ Post-Soviet Women: From Baltic to Central Asia (Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press) 1997, pp. 219-234. 
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because building the nation requires women to model themselves on Berehynia. 
On 6th March 1999, the newspaper Holos Ukrainy [Voice of Ukraine] published 
two greetings on March from two important male politicians. Ukrainian 
President Leonid Kuchma greeted women as Berehyni:��To Berehyni of our people. 
Greetings Ukrainian women on March". The Speaker for the House, Oleksandr 
Tkchenko addressed women as, "Women-mother, Women-wife, Berehynia of our 
people". 
Berehynia, the central image of women in Ukrainian mythology, represents the 
ideal mother and the spirit of the Ukrainian home—the perfect Ukrainian woman. 
She plays an essential role in preserving national history, identity and language. 
Now Berehynia has been appreciated as a model for Ukrainian women—'allegedly 
pure, maternal and self-sacrificial"^^ She has been the ''protectress of the nation, 
guardian of the domestic hearth and the generational fire, and the image of 
women's d o m e s t i c i t y " ? Berehynia has been the��protectress" for Ukrainians since 
antiquity. 
Katernya Motrych, a female journalist and author in Ukraine, published an 
article in Zhinka [XiHKa/Women] in January 1992, entitled、、丁o you women who 
stand next to the cradle of the nation, my message". In the article she discussed 
various issues related to women. She first discussed women's victimization during 
the Soviet era. They were��forced" to work and thus bore a ''double burden" at 
home and at work. Such victimization has an echo effect on the building and 
recalling of the collective memories discussed in chapter two. Then she turned to 
34、、丁o Berehyni of Our People. Greetings Ukrainian Women on March", Holos Ukrainy 
[Voice of Ukraine], March 1999. 
35 Solomea Pavlychko, ''Feminism in Post-Communist Ukrainian Society/ in Rosalind Marsh 
(ed.). Women in Russia and Ukraine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1996, 
pp.305-314. 
36 Marian 3. Rubchak, "Christian virgin or pagan goddess", in Rosalind Marsh (ed.), Women 
in Russia and Ukraine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1998, pp. 316-320. 
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the model of Berehynia, announcing: 
The Ukrainian woman has a responsible mission. Like the Blessed Virgin, 
the Ukrainian woman must give birth to the Ukrainian Savior... And it is up 
to us all to create the conditions within which she can once be herself, the 
Berehynia [pagan-goddess] of the nation. In a free and democratic Ukraine, 
the first thing that we must do is to liberate women from heavy and 
debilitating work, and provide the means that will enable them to devote 
themselves to child-rearing for the first seven years of the child's life...The 
salvation of our nation is-Women. The Mother, and the grandmother of the 
human race.... To her we must return her scared mission, encompassing 
that of the Blessed virgin and the Berehynia.^^ 
Women as ''saviors of the nation" certainly is not a new idea. It was inherited 
from the Soviet era. Today, women in Ukraine are also the saviors of the nation by 
concentrating their energy on their children and their home. The cliched duties of 
women continue to be confined to motherhood and domesticity. Nevertheless, the 
role of women as the creators and life-givers of the nation is also part of Ukrainian 
culture. Thus, Motrych aimed at merging the new duties Berehynia exemplifies with 
traditional Ukrainian culture. 
I. Women ^s National Duties 
Although the united and ultimate goal is to build a modern Ukrainian nation; 
there are in fact separate national goals for women and men. 
For women, national duties are two-fold. Motherhood limits women to 
domesticity (private sphere). Ukrainian women are the hearth mothers, solely 
responsible for nurturing children, and carrying and transmitting traditional 
Ukrainian folk cultural values from generation to generation. Publicly, women are 
37 Katernya Motrych, "To You Women Who Stand Next to the Cradle of the Nation, My 
Message" in Zhinka, (January 1992), pp.15. 
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depicted as the ''mother of the nation" and thus they are still mothers. Little 
reference is given to their personality and individual characteristics. Women can be 
women-mothers, working-mothers, or mother-laborers, but they cannot be 
themselves. By such dual depictions, private duties extend from the private sphere 
to the public sphere; the duties duplicate and overlap. Therefore, motherhood and 
the transmission of cultural values are women's main national duties in both private 
and public spheres. 
Women are expected to perform their glorious national duties. They need to 
give birth to ''nation's future saviors". In addition, they have to stay home teaching 
and socializing their children with Ukrainian culture and traditional values, thus 
Ukrainian traditional values can be transmitted from generation to generation. 
Then a unique Ukrainian identity can be developed. Because of such a mission, 
Ukrainian women have to exemplify invaluable Ukrainian traditional values and 
characteristics so that they can set an example for their children. This is what K. 
Motrych is referring to by recalling both the blessed virgin (Christian tradition) and 
Berehynia (Ukrainian pagan goddess). 
The images and values Berehynia bears are carried over from the private 
sphere, where women traditionally still dominate, to the public one. Berehynia 
fosters women's gendered national duties in three ways. Firstly, her characteristics 
and images confine women to the private sphere, which is the family. These 
characteristics are, at the same time, carried to public sphere. Second, the 
Berehynia cult rejects the quest for the rights of women in contemporary Ukraine 
because she already represents a mythical female empowerment in ancient 
Ukrainian matriarchal society. In matriarchal society, women were believed to be 
leaders. They were decision makers, property owners and heirs. Thus, now, 
through the revival of traditional Ukrainian value and culture including the alleged 
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matriarchal values, female empowerment is assumed to be automatically attained. 
Any further request on behalf of women would thus be redundant and unnecessary. 
Thirdly, the cult of Berehynia only recreates and fosters women's ''double burden" 
because women must work to support their families under the current economic 
circumstances (see chapter four). 
i7- Men's National Duties 
Men are leaders and decision-makers in the nation building project. Their 
��proper" place is in the public sphere. Most of the leaders in the Ukrainian 
government are men. In 1995, there was not a single women appointed as minister 
or head of state committees in Ukraine.^ ® An article in la Zhinka [I Am a Woma] 
'There Are No Women in Our Parliament" questioned the small number of women 
in the political sphere in Ukraine in 1994. In response to this question, Deputy 
Mykhailo Syrota commented: 
I believe that the time for women in Ukrainian politics has not yet 
arrived...because we are currently experiencing a power struggle that 
requires instant reactions and intense passion. This does not come 
naturally to women.^^ 
Another male politician Volodymyr Oliinyk, the mayor of Cherkassy, believes 
that ''politics is not a home, it is a man's game"，Mykhailo Syrota's comments 
showed the assumptions about''women's nature", namely that it is not suitable for 
38 Solomea Pavlychko, ''Progress on Hold: the Conservative Faces of Ukrainian Women", in 
Mary Buckley (ed.), Post-Soviet Women: From Baltic to Central Asia (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press) 1997, pp. 223. 
39 la Zhinka, no. 4 (1994), pp. 2-3. Quoted in Marian Rubchak, "The Way We Were: 
Reconfiguring the Past to Reinvent the Present", unpublished, pp. 8. Sincere thanks to the 
author. 
la Zhinka, no. 4 (1994), pp. 2-3. Quoted in Marian Rubchak, "The Way We Were: 
Reconfiguring the Past to Reinvent the Present", unpublished, pp. 8. Sincere thanks to the 
author. 
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politics. Volodymyr Oliinyk insisted that women should be at home. The responses 
of these two politicians reflect the conservative attitudes of men towards the 
participation of women in the political sphere. 
In 1999, only about ten per cent of the total seats in the Parliament in Ukraine 
went to women.Ai Only a very small number of Ukraine's ministries and state 
committees were headed by w o m e n . F o r example, Valentyna Dovzhenko was 
made head of the state committee of Ukraine for Family and Youth Affairs. She 
became the Minister of Ukraine for Family and Youth Affairs from 1997 to 1999. 
At home, men remain decision makers and leaders. They are heads of families 
and they have the final authority in adjudicating over conflicts and problems/^ 
Despite the fact that women are believed to be the guardians of families, the 
matriarchal myth does not apply there. This is why some sociologists have 
commented that patriarchal values are being revived in Ukraine/^ 
i77. Gender and Nation 
Women's gendered duties as biological reproducers and cultural transmitters in 
nation building are examined in the work of Nira Yuva卜Davis and Floya Anthias. 
Women are important in the nation building project because they are biological 
producers of ethnic collectives and groups. They are also ideological reproducers 
and transmitters of culture. Finally, they are transformed into signifiers of national 
41 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Gender in Development, "Women and Men 
in the Political Parties of Ukraine � , Gender /\nalysis of Ukrainian Society, pp. 11-12. Online 
access http://www.kiev.ua:8080/undp/qender/pub/analv5is 
An anonymous woman in Central Ukraine showed her pessimistic view on Ukraine's rule of 
law, "men establish laws. And men alone occupy state posts. A woman cannot protect 
herself with the help of the legislation" quoted in KIIS, "Gender Issues in the Transition in 
Urban and Rural Ukraine", World Bank and Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 1999, 
pp. 59. Her view may not be widespread, however, she is correct that the Ukrainian 
government is male-dominated and women are largely invisible. 
KIIS, "Gender Issues in the Transition in Urban and Rural Ukraine", World Bank and Kiev 
International Institute of Sociology, 1999, pp. 29. 
Solomea Pavlychko, "Feminism and post-communist Ukrainian society" in Rosalind Marsh 
(ed.), Women in Russia and Ukraine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1996, 
pp.311. 
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or ethnic differences. 
Certainly, in Ukraine today, the constant mission of Ukrainian women is 
proclaimed to be giving birth to the nation's saviors. Then they are supposed to 
take care of their future saviors by staying at home, socializing them and teaching 
them Ukrainian culture and traditional values. It is the national duty of women to 
provide for and maintain the health of children and assure the future of the nation. 
Executive Director of the Children of Chernobyl Relief Fund, Nadia Matkiwsky, 
emphasizes tha t��a n tion without healthy children is a nation without a future". 
Despite the fact that women have such a��sacred" mission, their position in the 
family is secondary. They are subordinates to their husbands. They are sometimes 
subject to family violence. Despite the ''double burden" of family and work, 
Ukrainian women must be self-sacrificing and they should neglect their personal 
interests for the sake of the family and the nation. Ironically, women define 
themselves in relation to men — as daughters, wives, mothers and grandmothers. 
Their individualist character is of the least importance. 
The sexualization of national duties is apparent. The ultimate goal is for the well 
being of the nation — the Ukrainian nation. Certainly women's national duties serve 
the nation building project. They play particular functions, mainly as mothers in the 
domestic sphere. There are many reasons for the creation and reaffirmation of 
such national duties of Ukrainian women. Depopulation is negatively affecting 
Ukraine. The self-sacrificing image is associated with the deteriorating economic 
situation. Inflation, rises in prices of necessities and the decline in living standard 
affect many Ukrainian people. Many of them cannot afford to buy daily goods and 
consumption goods. By promoting a self-sacrificing character, women are 
encouraged to steadfastly bear the deteriorating economic circumstances. 
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VI. Conclusion 
Nation building remains an important factor in making government policies in 
post-Soviet Ukraine. The so-called ''all-people project" is in fact gendered. As 
discussed in this chapter, women's national dutiies in the nation building project are 
sexualized. They are urged and required to help to build a modern Ukrainian nation. 
Women's national duties are confined to motherhood and domesticity. At the same 
time, women are cultural carriers and transmitters who are obliged to teach their 
children pure Ukrainian culture and traditional values because the revival of 
Ukrainian culture is central to building a Ukrainian nation. Women's national duties 
are determined by the male leaders of the project. 
The contemporary appeals made to the women of Ukraine to subordinate their 
interests and needs to the goals of nation building are not new. The historical roots 
were laid in the late nineteenth century in Galicia, where feminism and women's 
emancipation first emerged. Nonetheless, when Ukraine gained its independence 
in 1991, such appeals have been transformed into the needs of building a modern, 
unified nation. Women are again required to subordinate their interests to the 
national cause. 
Men and women have different national duties in the nation building project. 
Motherhood and the transmission of Ukrainian cultural values to their children have 
become women's duties in the project. They are required to model themselves on 
Berehynia, the ancient pagan goddess. Nonetheless, women's national duties are 
allocated according to gender. These duties confine women to motherhood and 
domesticity. Men are the nation builders, leaders and decision makers. They are 
also the head of families. Ironically, women are subject to "double subordination" in 
both the private sphere and the public sphere. 
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Chapter 4: WomeiVs Responses and Organizations 
I. Introduction 
This chapter aims to explore the responses of women and women's 
organizations in Ukraine to the nation building project, to the gendered roles it 
promotes, and to the cult of Berehynia. These responses are important to illustrate 
how women perceive their re-defined gender roles, and to examine whether or not 
they find these roles appealing and acceptable. As mentioned in chapter three, the 
Ukrainian women's movement in the late nineteenth century largely served the 
national cause. The contemporary women's movement likewise does not primarily 
work for women's interests. Therefore, the first part of this chapter focuses on the 
ideology of the women's movement in Ukraine, which is based on Ukraine's 
mythical matriarchal tradition. This matriarchy allegedly empowers women. The 
matriarchal myth is tightly linked to the archaeological work on the Trypillian 
culture, which is believed to be the foundation of Ukrainian culture five thousand 
years ago, and is also regarded as one of the oldest civilizations in Europe. Whether 
or not the analysis of these archaeological findings is correct, a prehistoric 
matriarchy does not guarantee contemporary women and their movement a better 
future. 
Chapter two has already examined the revival of Ukrainian culture as a core 
part of the nation building project and thus, the second part of this chapter turns 
attention to the responses of non-governmental women's organizations to the 
revival of traditional culture. 
The second part explores the audiences of the Cult of Berehynia. The responses 
of these audiences in mass media reveal that the cult of the ancient goddess is 
appealing to many. Being just like Berehynia is the ultimate ambition of many 
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women; this is also the requirement of most men. 
There are a number of reasons for the Ukrainian government to promote 
Berehynia as the ideal for Ukrainian women. These reasons include demographic 
characteristics and economic hardship, which will be analyzed in the third section of 
this chapter. 
Under the present circumstances, many Ukrainian women hope to emulate 
Berehynia. They are willing to be ''happy housewives" and nurturing mothers. 
Various factors guide women's choices. Poor economic conditions, general 
discrimination against women, and difficulties in getting jobs may be some of these 
factors. 
Historical Ukraine is usually described by Ukrainian scholars and government 
officials as a colony of Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. The priority of 
nationalism over women's issues is not unique to Post-Soviet Ukraine. Countries 
which were previously under colonial rule encounter similar circumstances as 
Ukraine does now. Thus, the final part of this chapter use two examples, the 
Chinese case and the Indian case, to illustrate their similar experiences and 
responses. 
II.The Revival of the ''Ukrainian Matriarchal Culture" 
I. Women's Movement and the Matriarchal Myth 
The ideology of the contemporary women's movement in Ukraine is based on 
Ukraine's matriarchal myth rather than on "imported" Western feminist ideas of 
women's emancipation from patriarchal power.丄 Therefore, it is essential to 
1 Tatiana Zhurzhenko, "Ukrainian Feminism(s): Between Nationalist Myth and 
Anti-Nationalist Critique", IWM Working Paper, Vienna, no. 2 (2001), pp. 4. 
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examine the content and context of this matriarchal myth since the myth justifies 
resistance to Western feminist ideas. In fact, this mythical matriarchal tradition 
does not help the women's movement in Ukraine. The myth supports the belief that 
women in Ukraine have always been powerful and empowered. Thus, there is no 
need, the argument goes, for Ukrainian women to seek more rights and the 
satisfaction of their needs. Furthermore, it hinders the full and individual 
development of women because the myth is only revived partially and selectively; 
the notion of women as the givers of life and creators of the nation is emphasized 
while the notion of women as leaders and decision makers is excluded in this 
revival. 
Ukraine's matriarchal myth stems from the archaeological evidence from the 
Trypillian Culture, which existed during the Neolithic Age within the borders of 
present day Ukraine. The Trypillan culture was first excavated about one 
hundred years ago. It was named 'Trypillian" because the archaeological site was 
near the Trypillia village thirty-five kilometers south of Kyiv. Unearthed materials of 
the culture included pottery, bones, and ceramic female figurines. Some of the 
female figurines were associated with fertile fields, therefore, the Trypillian 
civilization was believed to be matriarchal. 
Marjia Gimbutas includes the western part of present day Ukraine in her 
definition of "the Civilization of the Old Europe". She comments��”Tripolye is one of 
the best explored and richest cultures of Old Europe, a true civilization in the best 
meaning of the word".? Ukrainians are very proud of the Trypillian culture and 
regard it as ''the most developed civilization [of the time], not only in Europe but in 
2 Marjia Gimbutas, Joan Marler (ed.), The Civilization of Goddess: the World of Old Europe 
(San Francisco: Harper Collins Publishers) 1991, pp.101-102. 
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the w o r l d ? � � t h e original Indo-European civilization"* and even speculate that 
��much of the canon of classical (Greek) mythology was allegedly derived from the 
Trypillian store of myths and legends�5 and that it was��the most cultured country 
in Europe" of the time.^ Such claims made about the significance of the Trypillian 
culture are perhaps exaggerated, because neither literature, nor written records 
have been found. Nonetheless, as a seemingly tangible foundation for the 
matriarchal myth, it has considerable impact in Ukraine today. 
#7. Problems with the Matriarchal Myth 
Although some scholars tend to regard the Slav pagan goddess Berehynia as 
the representation of this mythical matriarchal tradition, such representation is 
questionable. Berehynia, the ancient Slav pagan goddess, has not yet proved to be 
the only image of this allegedly matriarchal culture. Archaeological evidence found 
from the Trypillian culture shows various representations of female figures on 
pottery, and on other remains, not clearly Berehynia. Nonetheless, Berehynia could 
be one of the various goddesses of the period. 
The matriarchal myth, as it exists today, reinforces certain gender stereotypes 
in which women are primarily mothers who give and sustain life. Therefore to rely 
on the ancient worship of females as the basis of female empowerment would only 
3 See such claim by the leader of the Peasant-Democratic Party Serhii Plachynda that 
''Ukrainian mythology is the oldest in the world. It became the basis for all Indo-European 
mythologies" in Solvnyk davno-ukramsko'f mifolohi'f (Kyiv: Ukrainsky pysmnnyk), 1993, pp. 
6. Quoted in Andrew Wilson, ''National History and Identity in Ukraine and Belarus'； in 
Graham Smith (ed.), Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: the Politics of National 
Identities (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press) 1988, pp. 29, pp. 229. 
4 Andrew Wilson, "National History and Identity in Ukraine and Belarus", in Graham Smith 
(ed.)/ Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: the Politics of National Identities 
(Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press) 1988, pp. 29, pp. 229. 
5 Andrew Wilson, "National History and Identity in Ukraine and Belarus" in Graham Smith 
(ed.), Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: the Politics of National Identities 
(Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press) 1988, pp. 29, pp. 229. 
6 Andrew Wilson, ''National History and Identity in Ukraine and Belarus'； in Graham Smith 
(ed.), Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: the Politics of National Identities 
(Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press) 1988, pp. 29, pp. 229. 
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confine women to motherhood, which represents essentially the nurturing and 
vulnerable nature of females/ The matriarchal myth works ultimately against the 
interests of women because it constrains women's individual development by 
limiting them to their primary role as mothers. 
III.WomerTs Organizations and Their Responses 
Some of the women's organizations in post-Soviet Ukraine claim to address 
both national interests and women's interests. However, very often these 
organizations prioritize national ones. They believe that women's interests cannot 
be guaranteed until Ukraine is a fully independent and sovereign nation. One of the 
major issues women's organizations shoulder is the revival of traditional Ukrainian 
culture. Nonetheless, such revival only confines women to their traditional gender 
roles as mothers and the nation's creators. 
One of the major women's organizations in Ukraine, the Union of Ukrainian 
Women [Souiz Ukrainok] clearly has this priority. Further, this organization regards 
the resurgence of Ukrainian culture as its main duty. In its interpretation of the 
resurgence of traditional values, women's roles are no more than mothers and 
national reproducers. 
The Union of Ukrainian Women was established in 1879 in Lviv in Western 
Ukraine (part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at that time). It was one of the 
largest women's organizations in Europe between the two world wars, one which 
helped in promoting women's education in rural areas, and in getting first aid 
materials to wounded people. 
Although one of its aims was originally to help in the rebirth of the women's 
1 Cynthia Eller, the Myth of Prehistory: Why an Invented Past Won't Give Women a Future 
(Boston: Beacon Press) 2000, pp. 5, pp. 7, pp. 55, and pp. 65. 
73 
movement in late nineteenth century in Galicia, its main goal today is to bring 
women into the current nation and state building project by encouraging them to 
cultivate a new generation of Ukrainian youth capable of contributing to the new 
nation. The speeches of its leaders, its Statute, and the conferences it organizes 
illustrate not only this priority, but also how the Union defines women's duties in 
national rebirth. 
The national president of the Union, Atena Pashko, offers justifications for the 
main aims of the Union. First, the Union cannot work purely for the interests of 
women because the ''whole history of it [the Union] has been the struggle for the 
freedom of Ukraine".® Second, she believes "because of colonialism, the social 
emancipation of women was inconceivable without national emancipation". ^ 
Therefore, the theme of the Union is to consider national rebirth (nation building) 
the broader task while feminist demands are the narrower one. Thus, the Union 
cannot just work for the interests of women. It must work for the interests of all 
people in Ukraine and the Ukrainian nation. 
Four conferences the Union organized can also illustrate the main aim of the 
Union, and its attitudes towards women's roles regarding the rebirth of the nation. 
A conference, ''Women in the Struggle for Ukrainian Independence" organized 
by the Union of Ukrainian Women in December 1990, focused upon the active role 
women have played in Ukraine's struggle for independence since the late 
nineteenth cen tu ry . In January 1992, at the Congress of the Union of Women in 
8 Atena Pashko, "Soiuz Ukrrainok v zhinochomu rush Prohramna dopovid", in Ukramka, 2(26) 
1994, p. 5. 
9 Atena Pashko, "Soiuz Ukrrainok v zhinochomu msi: Prohramna dopovid", in Ukramka, 2(26) 
1994, p. 5. 
1° Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, "Women's Organizations in Independent Ukraine: 
Prospect of Power", from the J.B. Rudnyckyi Distinguished Lecture Series (Lecture IV), 
Department of German and Slavic Studies, the University of Manitoba, pp. 4. Online access 
http://www.umanitoba• ca/facuIties/arts/Qerman and slavic/rudnvckvi series/4bohachevs 
ky.html. See also United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Gender in Development, 
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Kyiv, the Union called for a revival of national consciousness and ties of family to 
the effective function of the nation. ^ Interestingly, the three hundred and 
eighty-eight official delegates of the Union, representing six thousand members, all 
dressed in traditional embroidered costumes. At another conference, ''Women and 
Democracy" in July 1993, the Union documented��…[women] will know how to give 
birth and nurture physically and morally healthy, nationally conscious citizens of 
independent Ukraine". ^ ^ In a meeting held in Ivano-Frankivsk in July 1994 to 
celebrate the hundred and tenth anniversary of the first public meeting of women 
in 1884, the meeting was opened with women's gestures of patriotism. It is 
interesting to note that male representatives from the Ukrainian Parliament to this 
meeting insisted that despite the fact that the three most important words for 
independent Ukraine, ''freedom" ''democracy" and ''independence", are of feminine 
gender linguistically, they must be supported by the "strong male w i l l " ” 
Women, according to the Union, should take up auxiliary but still important 
roles in the national revival and nation building because women are the mothers 
who not only give birth to, but also nurture and socialize their children with 
Ukrainian cultural values. The revival of Ukrainian culture is so important that other 
"Women's NGO in the System of Civil Society" Gender Anafys/'s of Ukrainian Society, pp. 4. 
Online access http://www.kiev.ua:8080/undp/qender/pub/analvsis 
11 Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, ''Women's Organizations in Independent Ukraine: 
Prospect of Power", from the J.B. Rudnyckyi Distinguished Lecture Series (Lecture IV), 
Department of German and Slavic Studies, the University of Manitoba, pp. 4. Online access 
http://www.umanitoba.ca/faculties/arts/qerman and slavic/rudnvckvi series/4bohachevs 
kv.html 
12 Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, "Women's Organizations in Independent Ukraine: 
Prospect of Power", from the J.B. Rudnyckyi Distinguished Lecture Series (Lecture IV), 
Department of German and Slavic Studies, the University of Manitoba, pp. 4. Online access 
http://www.umanitoba.ca/faculties/arts/qerman and slavic/rudnvckvi seriesMbohachevs 
kv.html 
13 Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, "Women's Organizations in Independent Ukraine: 
Prospect of Power", from the J.B. Rudnyckyi Distinguished Lecture Series (Lecture IV), 
Department of German and Slavic Studies, the University of Manitoba, pp. 4-5. Online 
access 
http://www.umanitoba• ca/facuIties/arts/aerman and slavic/rudnvckvi seriesMbohachevs 
kv.html 
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ideas and ideologies are not yet suitable for Ukraine and for the Union, including 
feminism. 
Another non-governmental women's organization has similar aims as the Union 
of Ukrainian Women. The Zhinocha Hromada [The Community of Women] also 
aims to help in the revival of Ukrainian culture and traditional values. Nevertheless, 
it is also its goal to take into consideration women's interests and concerns, and to 
have women's voices heard in the government. 14 
Other non-government organizations share similar aims with the Union of 
Ukrainian Women and the Zhinocha Hromada. An organization called Berehynia 
aims at promoting the revival of the cult of Berehynia as a part of the larger revival 
of Ukrainian culture. One of the most patriotic women's organizations in Ukraine 
today is the Olena Teliha Association [Asotsiatsaiia Oleny Telihy]. Formed in 1994, 
the organization aims at promoting "patriotic education of new generations in the 
spirit of self-sacrifice service to the ideals of Ukrainian democratic statehood".15 It 
also works for the regeneration of the national consciousness of Ukrainian women, 
Ukrainian language, and spirituality, and the preservation of Ukrainian traditions. 
There are other non-governmental organizations trying to promote the 
interests of women. Nonetheless, these organizations are usually narrow in scope. 
For example, the Businesswomen's Club aims at helping women entrepreneurs. 
Indeed, most major non-governmental women's organizations in post-Soviet 
14 Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, "Women's Organizations in Independent Ukraine: 
Prospect of Power", from the J. B. Rudnyckyi Distinguished Lecture Series (Lecture IV), 
Department of German and Slavic Studies, the University of Manitoba, pp. 5-6. Online 
access 
htto:llwww.umanitoba.ca/faculties/arts/german and slavic/rudnyckyj series/4bohachevs 
ky.html. See also United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Gender in Development, 
"Women's NGO in the System of Civil Society", Gender Analysis of Ukrainian Society, pp. 10. 
Online access http://www.kiev.ua:SOSO/undp/gender/pub/analysis 
15 Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, "Women's Organizations in Independent Ukraine, 
1990-199S", in Sharon L. Wolchik, Volodymyr Zviglyanich (ed.), Ukraine: The Search for a 
National Identity (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers) 2000, pp. 272-273. 
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Ukraine do not work primarily for women's interests. Instead, they serve the 
national interests. Thus, women's interests are subsumed in the nation building 
project, in which the revival of Ukrainian culture and tradition is the priority. 
Motherhood as women's national duty is largely being accepted as the paradigm for 
women in the nation building project. 
IV. Mass Media 
The mass media in Ukraine are active in discussing the cult of Berehynia. Very 
often, editors, reporters, and columnists accept the revival of Berehynia as an 
essential component in the resurgence of Ukrainian culture. In these 
interpretations, women are defined according to their relationships to men; they 
are wives, mothers, and grandmothers. They are also the creators and reproducers 
of the Ukrainian nation. The commonly accepted view of women as creators of the 
nation is supported by the metaphor of Ukraine as a newborn baby, needing its 
mother(s) to care for it.^ ® 
Usually, reports about Berehynia are associated with nostalgic recollections of 
folk culture as symbolized by peasant houses and traditional customs. Some 
reports and articles praise the goddess and her tremendous contributions to the 
preservation of Ukrainian language and culture. Today, Berehynia represents 
women's double roles (indeed ''double burden") of maintaining the family structure 
and performing well in the workplace. These burdens show the difficulties of being 
Berehynia in present-day Ukraine. Yet, it must be noted, these reports 
demonstrate how Ukrainian women are able to be Berehyni (plural). Two articles 
illustrate this. 
16 Tatiana Zhurzhenko, ''Ukrainian Feminism(s): Between Nationalist Myth and 
Anti-Nationalist Critique", IWM Working Paper, Vienna, no. 2 (2001), pp. 4. 
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An article called��Berehyni chy rabyni" (��Berehyni or Slaves?") appeared on the 
newspaper Vechirnyi Kyiv [Evening Kyiv], and expressed concern about the 
''double burden" of women. On one hand, women take leading roles in agricultural 
farms and on the other hand, women are solely responsible for family matters. 
These anonymous female field workers are the Berehynia of today.^ ^ Certainly, this 
may be related to the gradual feminization of agriculture in Ukraine. Many 
Ukrainian women are farm workers partially because village men move to urban 
areas for better jobs.丄® Two-fifth of all employed women in Ukraine in rural areas 
engage in agriculture and forestry. Women contribute half of all manual labor on 
farms, but they perform about two-thirds of the manual work.^ ^ 
Another article titled ''It is not easy to be a Berehynia" focuses on the��uneasy" 
role of a city councilwoman, Liudmyla Olekandrivna Zakresko, who has performed 
her promised assignments in her local jurisdiction well while at the same time not 
giving up the traditional role of mother.^° Therefore, the councilwoman is a known 
Berehynia. In other words, she is following the example Berehynia has set up. She 
is greatly praised by her male colleagues because she can still perform her 
''natural" role as a good wife and a nurturing mother. At the same time, her career 
is seen as a bo门us. 
A male colleague of Liudmyla Olekandrivna Zakresko expresses his deep 
gratitude towards this modern Berehynia by referring to her as ''Woman-Mother, 
17 Vechirnyi Kyiv (Evening Kyiv), 20 November, 1998. Quoted in Marian Rubchak, "The Way 
We Were: Reconfiguring the Past to Reinvent the Present", unpublished, pp. 14, pp. 19. 
Sincere thanks to the author. 
18 KIIS, "Gender Issues in the Transition in Urban and Rural Ukraine", World Bank and Kyiv 
International Institute of Sociology, 1999, pp. 42. 
19 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Gender in Development,��Gender 
Processes in Rural Areas", Gender Analysis of Ukrainian Society, pp. 15-16. Online access 
httD://www.kiev.ua:808Q/undp/qender/Dub/analvsis 
stolytsia, no. 17, issue 111 (4-10 March 1999), pp. 1. Sincere thanks to the author. 
Marian Rubchak,、、丁he Way We Were: Reconfiguring the Past to Reinvent the Present", 
unpublished, pp. 14, pp. 19. 
78 
Woman-Nation Creator". He also regrets that only once a year are "great women" 
celebrated and praised, saying "It's shameful that we men choose to honor 
Woman-Mother, Woman-Worker, Woman-Nation Creator only once a year". 
He therefore suggests celebrating Women's Day every Friday.^ ^ However, it 
must be noted that, Women's Day in Ukraine has become an ''annual anti-feminist 
ritual" or indeed��the most important male festival" in which women are submissive 
and passive characters, represented as eager to accept the domination of male 
power. 22 
In a discussion workshop with scholars of Slavic studies, I had an opportunity to 
listen to Dr. Marian Rubchak's personal account of the��celebration" of Women's 
Day in Ukraine in 1999. Major streets in the capital city Kyiv were full of flags and 
posters of beautiful, feminine, and submissive female images of Berehyni.^^ This 
shows how Women's Day has become a major male festival, just as the Ukrainian 
born and raised literary scholar Solomea Pavlychko has also commented. 
Furthermore, the cult of Berehynia is Ukraine's timeless symbol. The cliched 
discourse about Berehynia is legitimated by her enduring importance in Ukrainian 
culture. One anonymous person who wrote an appeal to urge all Ukrainians to 
return to the everlasting traditions, insisted this would not only help Ukraine but 
also all people on the earth. 
Why not return to those timeless national traditions, so that we truly might 
According to Marian Rubchak, rest on Friday was indeed a pre-Christian practice. Such 
suggestion has special meaning: calls for a return to the ancient custom. See Marian 
Rubchak,、、丁he Way We Were: Reconfiguring the Past to Reinvent the Present", unpublished, 
pp.37. Sincere thanks to the author. 
22solomea Pavlychko,��Feminism and post-communist Ukrainian society", in Rosalind Marsh 
(ed.), Women in Russia and Ukraine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 
pp.307-308. 
23 -Women in Slavic Culture and Literature", June 18-29 2001, a discussion workshop of the 
Summer Research Laboratory on Russia and Eastern Europe, organized by the Russian and 
Eastern European Center of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
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regard women as Berehynia—goddess and protectress of the domestic 
hearth. Once our women are Berehyni, Ukraine will be the Berehynia of all 
humanity. 
The position of Berehynia is not only accepted by the common Ukrainian people 
but also highly praised as a timeless, undisturbed, and national tradition. Because 
of Ukraine's statelessness and the Soviet era, the cult of Berehynia has been 
disrupted. Now that Ukraine is an independent and sovereign country, it is being 
used to legitimate the Ukrainian national culture, recover it, and place it in a 
superior position. 
Attention to the subjectivity of women is essential to a gendered perspective of 
the roles of women in Ukraine's nation building project. In interviews done with 
Ukrainian women by a Ukrainian-American journalist who traveled back to her 
birthplace searching for her identity, Ania Savage describes how the cult of 
Berehynia is accepted by her interviewees. The first interview was done with the 
chief editor of Z/7/A7/ca, Lidia Mazur, who summarizes the contemporary ambitions of 
Ukrainian women. 
What do women aspire to? 
If she's a young mother, she will tell you her dream is to stay home, take 
care of the children, and cook. That's the cult of Berehynia fulfi l led.24 
Another interview done with Deputy Iryna Belosusova, who characterizes 
women in contemporary Ukrainian society, centers on the gender stereotypes 
conveyed by Berehynia and her belief that Berehynia represents the honorable 
female roles that should remain in Ukrainian society. 
24 Ania Savage, Return to Ukraine (Texas: Texas A&M University Press, College Station) 
2000, pp.155-159. 
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In our society the cultural stereotype Berehynia immediately comes to my 
mind: protectress of the domestic hearth, and mother as giver of life and of 
our nation. These are sacred and honored female roles. They have been 
throughout the history, and they should remain.^ ^ 
Ukrainian women are convinced to be Berehyni. Importantly, the cult of 
Berehynia confines Ukrainian women to the role of mothers, and thus confirms 
their subordinate position within families. Women accept this and indeed aspire to 
emulate the model of Berehyni. 
V. Practical Reasons for Promoting Berehynia 
Certainly, there are some practical purposes that the cult of Berehynia serves. 
It serves the current demographic needs. Moreover, the Ukrainian government 
wants self-sacrifice from women. Women have been a major source of labor in the 
job market, and have been the breadwinners for their family. Yet, women are also 
responsible for the household as well. 
/- Demographic Factors 
Berehynia confirms Ukrainian women's role as mothers. Fertility is stressed. 
There are practical reasons for the promotion of fertility. Demographic statistics 
can illustrate the need for higher fertility in post-Soviet Ukraine. Ukraine has a huge 
population of fifty million, which is the second highest population in Europe. 
However, since the period of 1990-2000, Ukraine has experienced a negative 
growth in population (-0.8%).^^ Suffering from a negative difference between 
births and deaths from 1992 to 1996 at an increasing rate, Ukraine's population has 
declined by one million since 1990. This trend has continued since independence. 
Ukraine has lost near one million people from 1996 to 2000 (see Figure 
According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census predictions, Ukraine will continue to 
Ukraina, no. 1, November 1999. 
26 The U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Data Base. Online access 
http://www.census.qov 
27 The U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Data Base. Online access 
http://www.census.qov 
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suffer a negative growth in population from the periods of 1990-2050 (ten-year 
increment scale) (see Figure 3).^ ® 
Year Population (in thousands) Change in Population 
1980 50,047 N/A 
1990 51,600 N/A 
1991 51,650 50 
1992 51,691 41 
1993 51,609 -82 
1994 51,378 -231 
1995 51,090 -288 
1990-1995 -510 
1996 50,772 -318 
1997 50,448 -324 
1998 50,125 -323 
1999 49,811 -314 
2000 49,507 -304 
1996-2000 N/A -1,583 
Figure 2: Changes in Population in Ukraine 1990-2000 
Period Population Growth (。/。） 
1980-1990 0.3 
1990-2000 -0.829 (actual) 
2000-2010 -0.4 (predicted) 
2010-2020 -0.3 (predicted) 
2020-2030 -0.4 (predicted) 
2030-2040 -0.5 (predicted) 
2040-2050 -0.7 (predicted) 
Figure 3: Population Growth in Ukraine 1980 to 2050 
The decline in population is partially caused by a sharp fall in fertility rates. 
Since 1989, the fertility rate has been decreasing rapidly. The number of families 
28 The U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Data Base. Online access 
http://www.census.qov 
29 The U.S. Department of Commerce, Country Guide: Ukraine, Commercial Service. Online 
access httD://www.usatrade.qov. 
82 
with one child or no children is growing. At present, Ukraine belongs to the group of 
countries that have the lowest birth rates. In 1996, the crude birth rate was 9.1 
(newborns) per 1000 population, which was 28.3% lower than in 1990. The overall 
fertility rate fell to 1.3 children per couple (1.1 in urban settlements and 1.8 in rural 
areas). 
The decline in birth rates has also been accompanied by the concentration of 
births in young mothers. In 1996, 84.7% of children were born to mothers under 
the age of 30, in contrast to 80% one year earlier. Moreover, the number of children 
born out of wedlock is on the rise. In 1995, more than one-tenth of children were 
born to unwed mothers which about one-fifth more than those in 1990. The fall in 
fertility is due to the fact many couples cannot afford to have more than one child 
and many decide not to have any because they need the wives' incomes to support 
the family and thus cannot leave wives home to take care of the children. Many 
couples would prefer a small family so that they can devote all their resources to 
their one child. Economic hardship and the disastrous effects of the Chernobyl 
disaster have been significant factors in leading to the decline in reproduction 
厂ates. 
Hundreds of thousands of civilians were affected by the catastrophic effects of 
the Chernobyl accident on 26 April 1986. Reports showed that more fifteen million 
people have been victimized by the radiation disaster. Of the six hundred thousand 
people involved with the cleanup, many are now dead or sick. Fifteen years after 
the accident, babies are still born with no eyes, no limbs, and with various types 
and intensities of disabilities. Decrease in reproduction is also due to the fact that 
many couples are concerned about deterioration in the environment because of the 
Chernobyl accident. 
As a result of the trend of depopulation, the Ukrainian government encourages 
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its female citizens to bear more children for the sake of the future development of 
the country. If women continue to choose not to be mothers, Ukraine will prolong 
I 
its depopulation process, which will negatively affect its development. Recent 
demographic statistics show that the child population (zero to seventeen years old) 
in Ukraine has started to decrease since 1990. From 1990 to 1998, the child 
population decreased by about 10 % (from 13,257, 000 in 1990 to 11,839,000 in 
1998).3° The statistical figure for child population for the range of zero to four 
years old is more striking. From 1990 to 1998, the total number of children of this 
age range dropped by 34 % (from 3,714,000 to 2,442,000).^^ 
Thus the Ukrainian government urges female citizens to follow the example of 
Berehynia, the goddess of fertility, to bear more saviors of the nation. Further, to 
bear more children is only part of women's duties. It's also women's duty to protect 
their children and give them a safe environment. As the Chief Executive of the 
Children of Chernobyl Relief Fund, Nadia Matkiwsky, notes ,��a n tion without 
healthy children is a nation without a future".^ ^ 
Decline in population and low fertility rate lead to various problems. One of the 
major problems is a high dependency rate. Ukraine's elderly dependency rate (the 
ratio of age above sixty population to eighteen to fifty-nine population) increased 
from 1989 to 1992, and from 1995 to 1998. The ''dome-shaped'' population 
pyramid of 1989 and the ''bell-shaped'' population pyramid of 1998 below show the 
demographic characteristics and potential demographic and social problems 
Ukraine may face. One of the social problems is aging. High dependency and aging 
30 "Women in Transition", The MONEE Project CEE/CIS/Baltics. Regional Monitoring Report, 
no. 6 (1999), Statistical annex, pp. 111-112. 
"Women in Transition", The MONEE Project. CEE/CIS/Baltics. Regional Monitoring Report, 
no. 6 (1999), Statistical annex, pp. 111-112. 
32 Children of Chernobyl Relief Fund Newsletter, vol. Xvi (Summer 1999), p. 1. See also 
httD://www.childrenofchornobvl.orq/hrclinton.htm. 
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problem lead to a lower living standard and to increasing pressure on social 
security and social welfare systems. The situation is further complicated by the 
deterioration of social welfare and public health services in post-Soviet Ukraine. 
Ukraine, like other newly independent countries of the former Soviet republics, is 
actively engaged in economic, social, and political transformations, and has 
experienced budget deficit for most years. As a result, the Ukrainian government 
has cut funds for public health and social services. 
The creation and maintenance of families is vital to ensuring the existence of 
favorable circumstances for development. This is because a family is the basic unit 
in society. Stable family structure can also bring the stability to society and thus a 
young population supports the continuous development of the country. A 
continuous decline in the population and birth rate, along with the aging problem, 
will eventually over-burdens the government's social welfare system. Thus, 
depopulation and decline in birth rate threatens the continuous development of 
Ukraine, and is a problem that the Ukrainian government must solve. 
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33 The U.S. Census Bureau, International Date Base. Online access http://www.census.qov 
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ii. Economic Hardship 
Economic hardship is common in societies in transition. Ukraine is no exception. 
The independent Ukrainian government has had to face various problems after the 
break-up of the Soviet Union in 1989, and it has to solve the problems that 
perestroika and glasnost could not. Economic, social, political and cultural issues 
are all the work of the new government. 
Ukraine's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell almost one-fifth from 1991 to 
1992. In 1994, GDP dropped almost a quarter when compared with the previous 
year. The real GDP also declined from 1996 to 1999 (Figure 7). GDP per capita also 
decreased greatly which reflected a considerable decline in Ukrainians' income. 
Furthermore, both Gross Industrial Output (GIO) and Consumer Goods Production 
(CGP) fell greatly from 1991 to 1994 (Figure 6). Consumption also shrank. 
Ukrainians did not consume or they could not afford to buy goods because their 
deposable income fell. As a result of this, production for consumer goods adjusted 
accordingly. 
33 The U.S. Census Bureau, International Date Base. Online access http://www.census.qov 
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Gross Domestic Product -2.4 -13.5 -16.8 -14.2 -23.0 -12.8 
Gross Industrial Output (GIO) -0.4 -4.8 -6.4 -7.6 -27.7 -11.0 
Gross Agriculture Output (GAO) -3.7 -13.2 -8.4 1.5 17.0 -2.0 
Consumer Goods Production (CGP) 5.8 -5.1 -9.4 -15.3 -26.7 N/A 
Consumer Prices (annual average。/。严 N/A 91 1210 4735 891 376 
Figure 6: Ukrainian Domestic Economy 1990-1995 36 
1996 1997 1998 1999 
Real GDP Growth Rate (%) -10.0 -3.2 -1.7 -0.4 
GDP Per Capita (actual US$) 854 863 618 619 
F igure 7: Ukra in ian Domest i c E conomy 1996-1999 ^^  
1994 199538 1995 1997 1993 1999 
Inflation (%) 991 477 40.0 10.3 20.0 22.0 
Unemployment (official %) 0.4 0.5 1.6 3.1 4.3 4.8 
F igure 8: Inf lat ion in Ukra ine 1994-1999 ^^  
Ukra in ians also exper ienced inf lation. The inf lation rate reached a peak of over 
10,000 0/0 in 1 9 9 3 . 4 ° prjces of goods and serv ices rose t remendous ly since 
independence. Consumer pr ices kept rising s ince 1991 and reached 4,735 % in 
1994 when compared wi th prices in 1990. Furthermore, fami ly wages decreased 
more than half s ince 1990.41 More than eight straight years of decl in ing GDP have 
led to w idespread poverty. The s tandard of l iving for most c i t izens has decl ined 
Ukraine: 1999 Country Profile, Business Forum of the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD). 
36 John E. Ted Strom, "Ukraine's Economy: Strategic Issues for Successful Recovery", in 
Taras Kuzio (ed.)/ Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation (London: 
M.E.Sharpe) 1998, pp. 203. 
37 The U.S. Department of Commerce, Country Guide: Ukraine, Commercial Service. 
http://www.usatrade.qov . 
38 1994 and 1995 data from King Banaian, The Ukrainian Economy Since Independence 
(Cheltenham; Northampton; MA: Edward Elgar), 1999, pp.100. 
39 The U.S. Department of Commerce, Country Guide: Ukraine, Commercial Service. 
http://www.usatrade.qov. 
40 Paul Hare, Mohammed Ishaq, and Saul Estrin, "Ukraine: The Legacies of Central Planning 
and the Transition to a Market Economy" in Taras Kuzio (ed.). Contemporary Ukraine: 
Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation (London: M.E.Sharpe) 1998, pp. 182. 
41 Poverty in Ukraine; Report No. 15602-UA, the World Bank, 27 June 1996. 
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significantly since the early 1990s. 
Since the Soviet era, women have been household managers in charge of 
exchanging necessities with other families or people. They have always borne the 
brunt of poor economic situations: poor standard of living and inflation. 
Nonetheless, they are asked to bear these meekly, without complaint. The 
self-sacrificing characteristics that Berehynia promotes require women to bear the 
deteriorating economic circumstances. 
VI. ''Double Burden" Still 
Certainly, there are several reasons for the Ukrainian government to promote 
the cult of Berehynia. Why, though, do Ukrainian women wish to model themselves 
on Berehynia? 
After gaining independence in 1991, Ukraine has been undergoing various 
transitions from a socialist system to capitalist one. The first novel phenomenon 
after communism was unemployment. Unemployment was theoretically 
non-existent before, but it struck Ukrainian society severely. Women were at a 
greater disadvantage than men under these conditions. Unemployment does have 
a female face. Among those unemployed (official data), about two-thirds of them 
are women. (But the Den [Day]) said it is about eighty per cent.42) Among these 
women, seventy per cent of them have higher education and among these, 
forty-five per cent of them have graduated from higher education institutions/^ 
The Den [Day] reported that there was a new wave of unemployment in 1999 (or 
Ruslana Pisotska, "Thank You! You're Fired. A new wave of unemployment is expected in 
early 1999", the Den (Day), Internet edition, 
http: //www.dav. kiev.ua/DIGEST/1998/37/finance/fi n 1. htm. 
43 KIIS, "Gender Issues in the Transition in Urban and Rural Ukraine", World Bank and Kyiv 
International Institute of Sociology, 1999, pp. 20. 
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the ninth wave). Apart from these data, it is also difficult for unemployed women to 
return to the labor market. There are constraints for them to do so despite the fact 
that most of them do want to work. One of the constraints is that women are so 
firmly confined to the domestic sphere. Women's roles are confined to 
dyad—maternity-housekeeping and doing housework and child rearing are their 
duties. These duties are in many ways mandatory.斗斗 
Everyday life is affected by the shrinking of the consumer markets, rising food 
prices, decreasing trade, and fewer and fewer jobs. Such a deteriorating economic 
environment affects every person in Ukraine, both men and women.斗^ Yet, women 
are more vulnerable than men for several reasons. Women are regarded as the 
secondary sex and subordinate to men. Because of their status in society, they are 
not treated on an equal basis. On average, women earn only seventy per cent of 
the salary men do of the same o c c u p a t i o n . ^ Research also shows that greater 
gender inequality in wages becomes apparent in Ukraine when compared with 
o the r Eastern European c o u n t r i e s " 
Moreover, women are discriminated against at work and they are sometimes 
sexually harassed by their bosses or supervisors. Nonetheless, women have only 
two choices: quit or stay. The following quotes reveal this. 
A working woman: 
KIIS, "Gender Issues in the Transition in Urban and Rural Ukraine" World Bank and Kyiv 
International Institute of Sociology, 1999, pp. 32. 
45 See Fangfang Yang, Chuang wai shi Heihai: lai zi Wugelan xiao zhen de yang guang shou 
jj [The Black Sea is Just Outside: A Diary from a town in Ukraine] (Taibei : Zhiku gufen 
youxian gongsi), 2000. It is a diary written by a Chinese girl who went to a small town in 
Crimea to meet her family old friend. Her diary showed the really bad living situation in 
Crimea, including the irregular supplies of hot water in winter, and the lack of goods in 
stores. 
46 KIIS, ' 'Gender Issues in the Transition in Urban and Rural Ukraine", World Bank and Kyiv 
International Institute of Sociology, 1999, pp. 19. 
47 Elizabeth Brainerd, "Women in Transition: Changes in Gender Wage Differentials in 
Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union" Industrial & Labor Relations Review, vol. 54, 
issue 1 (October 2000), pp. 138-162. 
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My daughter was hired by a private firm. And the owner told her: “ Now you 
are my property. I will do with you everything I want". She worked for two 
months and left.^ ® 
An unemployed woman: 
I was subjected to sexual harassment, but I think I did not give him an 
occasion for it. I did not allow him to unwind this story. As a result I was 
fired.49 
Thus, it is not uncommon for women to hope to stay at home and be Berehynia. 
The work place is unpleasant and they are underpaid and abused. Nonetheless, the 
cult of Berehynia confines women to the private sphere. It not only discourages 
them from work, but also dissuades them from engaging in public activities on the 
grounds that they need to devote all their time to giving birth and to nurturing their 
children. Thus, home is women's proper sphere. Yet, in post-Soviet Ukraine, a 
family cannot survive upon a single income. A dual income instead is desperately 
needed. As a result, women are given the duties of giving birth and nurturing 
children, and if they can find and retain a job in the current climate, they are still 
required to work to earn a living for the family. The ''Double burden" phenomenon, 
which was common in the Soviet era, still remains in post-Soviet Ukra ine .The 
cult of Berehynia, thus, only fosters women's ''double burden". 
An article titled ''Women after Communism: A Bitter Freedom" talks about the 
hard life of Czech, Polish and Hungarian women after the fall of communism.^^ 
48 KIIS, "Gender Issues in the Transition in Urban and Rural Ukraine", World Bank and Kyiv 
International Institute of Sociology, 1999, pp.60-61. 
49 KIIS, "Gender Issues in the Transition in Urban and Rural Ukraine", World Bank and Kyiv 
International Institute of Sociology, 1999, pp. 60-61. 
50 In a private discussion with university students from Ukraine, I was able to listen to the 
description of double burden Ukrainian women experience. My classmate Vira Byy who is a 
graduate student in Lviv University told me how her mother, a physician has been solely 
responsible for nurturing her and her sister, housework as well as the heavy workload of her 
occupation. Vira Byy and I were students at Harvard Summer School (2000). She was 
sponsored by the Harvard Ukrainian Summer Institute to help students who are learning 
Ukrainian. 
51 Elzbieta Matynia, ''Women after Communism: A Bitter Freedom", Social Research, vol. 61' 
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Women in these former socialist countries are required not only to shoulder a 
''double burden" as they have done in the past, but also a ''triple double". Apart 
from the full-time jobs these women have to work for a family wage, they are solely 
responsible for housework and the nurturing of their children. These women also 
have to earn extra income by working as part-time hawkers in weekend-markets 
because of economic hardship. The title alone powerfully illustrates the dilemma 
women face after the breakup of the Soviet Union. 
Ukrainian women a lso��enjoy" bitter freedom. They certainly face the same 
problems as Czech, Polish and Hungarian women are enduring in their transitional 
economies. On one hand, they are��advisecr to follow the example of Berehynia, to 
be excellent mothers and thus to be confined to domesticity. On the other hand, 
they are also required to engage in economic activities in order to generate income 
to support their families. Apart from their normal jobs, some of the women also risk 
engaging in ''shuttle business". In other words, some Ukrainian women who live on 
the Ukrainian-Polish border, engage in cross border trade by bringing cheaper 
goods from Poland or Ukraine and selling them in either country. This border trade 
is dangerous because these women can be caught by customs or the police. 
Nevertheless, Ukrainian women have to take risks because they have to supply 
necessary goods for their families. It is supposed to be a woman's duty.^ ^ 
Apart from women's ''double burden", women in Ukraine are subject to another 
risk. Ukraine has already become a center for ''exporting" women to Western 
Europe, the Middle East and Asia for prostitution. Very often, Ukrainian women are 
trafficked either by force or by false advertisements to these places. Although the 
issue 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 351-377. 
52 Tatiana Zhurzhenko,��Gender and Identity Formation in Post-Socialist Ukraine: The Case 
of Shuttle Business" in Rae Bridgman, Sally Cole, and Healther Howard-Bobiwash (ed.). 
Feminist Fields: Ethnographic Insights (Peterborough, Ont: Broadview Press) 1999, pp. 
243-263. 
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issue of ''white slavery" has aroused concerns from the United Nations," the 
United States, international women's organizations, ^^  some Ukrainian 
people,56the Ukrainian government has adopted only limited measures to tackle 
the trafficking of women. Some reports even indicate that government officers are 
involved in the illegal trafficking of women across borders, or that they co-operate 
with the mafia to earn money from the illegal transportation of women. Ironically, 
some government officers justify the "trade" of Ukrainian women as a way to earn 
necessary foreign funds for the development of Ukraine.^^ Therefore, it is not 
surprising to know that the Ukrainian government neither initiates any measures to 
combat the illegal trafficking of women, nor pays full attention to it as a significant 
problem. 
The trafficking of women also illustrates the attitudes of people towards these 
victims who luckily escape from their trafficked conditions. These victims are 
viewed not as victims, but as bad women who would sell their bodies or who would 
be willing to engage in the sex trade. Family members of these women are 
ashamed of them. Their fellow villagers discriminate against them. Victims do not 
get help either from the central government or the local government. Despite the 
fact that these victims may have��earned" foreign funds for their country, they are 
53 "Women in Transition", The MONEE Project. CEE/CIS/Baltics. Regional Monitoring Report, 
no. 6 (1999), chapter 5, pp. 11 
The concerns of the United States were expressed in the speech of Hilary Rodham Clinton 
in Lviv. See also the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), "Putting an End to 
the Trafficking of Women in the NIS and CEE�, August 2000. Online access www.irex.orq 
55 See the Winrock International, Women's International Network News, vol. 25, issue 3 
(Summer 1999), pp. 73. 
56 A gateway to Ukrainian issues www.branna.conn has established a sub-section on the 
victims of trafficking of women. The sub-section interviews some victims, obviously, women 
who have been brought to other places for sexual trade. Some of them were abused and 
tortured. They cannot return home until they have "paid" the fees needed for bringing them 
to brothels. See also "Plenty of Muck, Not Much Money", Economist, vol. 351, issue 8118 
(05/08/99), pp.52. 
57 See the Winrock International, Women's International Network News, vol. 24, issue 2 
(Spring 1998), pp. 25 
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not considered to be the nation's "valuable" citizens.^^ 
Women are the big losers in post-Soviet Ukraine. They suffer in family, at work 
and in society. Sexual abuse, family violence, sexual harassment in the workplace, 
rape, and trafficking of women are all possible threats that endanger women. 
Ironically, women are not regarded as victims in such cases.^ ^ The sexual crime 
rate against women has risen since 1991. It is estimated that sexual perversion 
rose three times from 1991 to 1996.6° Home provides no shelter, the law no 
protection, and the public no sympathy for women. 
VII. Gender, Nation and Post-colonSalism 
Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak uses the ideas of colonialism in her analyses of 
women's activities in Galicia. She regards the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a 
colonial power and Western Ukraine as a colony. She is not the only scholar who 
applies the concept of colonialism to describe Ukraine's situation before its 
independence. Russification was a forced cultural assimilation that destroyed 
Ukrainian culture. It is useful here to compare and contrast women's duties in 
different national liberation movements. Two cases are discussed here: China 
before the 1911 Revolution, and Post-colonial India. These two cases illustrate 
women's particular functions in nationalist struggle and the priority of nationalism 
and national interests over the interests of women. 
I. Gender and Nationhood: China before the 1911 Revolution 
Pre-revolution China was regarded as a semi-colony in the late nineteenth 
58 "Currency Prostitutes" is the term that refers to the sex trade 
59 KIIS, "Gender Issues in the Transition in Urban and Rural Ukraine", World Bank and Kyiv 
International Institute of Sociology, 1999, pp. 27-29, 55-61. 
60 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Gender in Development, "The Problem of 
Violence against Women", Gender Analysis of Ukrainian Society, pp. 2. Online access 
httD://www.kiev.ua:8080/undp/aender/Dub/analvsis 
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century. Various great powers, like Britain, Germany, the United States, Japan, 
France and Russia all occupied lands in China in their own��spheres of influence". 
Nonetheless, China did try to strengthen itself. Yet, reforms ended in vain. China 
was still backward and uncompetitive. 
It was Chinese male scholars who began to link the nation's weaknesses to 
those of Chinese women. These traditional male scholars regarded Chinese 
women as illiterate, ignorant, traditional, and physically weak because of their 
bound-feet. Therefore, they could not give birth to strong Chinese children, who 
were to be the pillars of China's future. Male scholars believed that Chinese women, 
on one hand were sources of China's weaknesses and backwardness, yet at the 
same time, were the potential saviors of the nation. If Chinese women could be 
educated, liberated and stronger, then they would be able to give birth to healthier 
and stronger children. They could also socialize their children with more��Western� 
and educated minds, so that China could have a better future. ^ ^ The mixed 
blessing of women to the nation indeed aroused concern over women's situation in 
China's long history. Some avant-garde females even formed their own 
organizations to work for the interests and benefits of women. The women's 
movement emerged as a subsidiary to the full-fledged national movement. 
Nationhood and motherhood were thus inextricably linked. Women, perhaps for 
61 One of the foremost scholars and reformers who linked women's emancipation and China' 
one was Kong You-wei. Educated in traditional Confucius values, Kong noted the sources of 
China's backwardness and weakness with China's weak female citizens. Thus, the first step 
to build a strong and modern China would start from Reforming' and 'improving' women who 
were mothers of China's future. See Kang Youwei (1858-1927),��Qing jin funu chanzu z o u � 
[Requesting a Ban on Binding Feet of Women], in Zhongguo shixueshi [Chinese Historical 
Association] (ed.), Wuxu bianfa [The 1898 Reform Movement] (Shanghai: Shenzhou 
guoguangshe) 1953, vol.2, pp. 242-244. Liang Qichao (1873-1929),��Lun nuxue" [On 
Women's Education], in Li Yuning and Zhang Yufa (ed.), Jindai Zhongguo nuquan yundong 
shiliao [Documents on Feminist Movement in Modern China, 1842-1911] and "Jiechanzu hui 
x u � [Discussion of the Anti-Footbinding Society], in Liang Qichao, Yingbingshi wenji 
[Writings on an ice-drinker's studio] (Taipei: Taiwan Zhonghua shuju) 1960, vol. 1, pp. 1-93. 
Also Charlotte L. Beahan, "In the Public Eyes: Women in Early Twentieth-Century China", in 
Richard W. Guisso, Stanley Johannesen (ed.), Women in China: Current Directions in 
Historical Scholarships (New York: Philo Press, E. Mellon Press) 1981, pp.215-238. 
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first time in Chinese history, were included in national affairs; they were more than 
just citizens, they were ''mothers of the nation". 
The popular and accepted ideology, however, was that women could not be 
liberated from the traditional feudal system if the nation was not first liberated from 
the imperialistic activities of the great powers. Women, therefore, had to devote 
themselves to national struggle first, in order to achieve their own liberation. 
Certainly, women played an important role in this national struggle. However, 
they were confined to being the ''mothers'' of better and stronger citizens. Their 
own interests were neither heard nor respected because their roles were limited to 
their reproductive function. Women's education was not for the benefit of women. 
It was aimed at training women to be ''virtuous wives and excellent mothers", who 
could manage the household well and educate their children. Women's individual 
interests and training were not an aim of women's education. 
The Chinese case illustrates some parallels with the Ukrainian case. Women's 
organized activities in Galicia worked for the interests of the national liberation 
movement, while women's individual concerns were not the goal. National interests 
were prioritized over all other interests, including women's interests, as they 
continue to be in Ukraine today. 
Feminism, Nationalism and the Third World 
The women's movement in post-colonial India was likewise subsumed under 
the national movement. The totalizing effects of nationalism were obvious. 
Nationalism typically serves a s � � a n overarching umbrella" that subsumes other 
issues, including women's issues.^ ^ Thus, when Indian nationalists speak on behalf 
62 R. Radhakishnan, "Nationalism, Gender, and the Narrative of Identity", in Andrew Parker, 
Mary Russo, Doris Sommer and Patricia Yaeger (ed.), Nationalisms and Sexualities fNew 
York: Routledge), 1992, pp.78. 
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of other issues, they speak in the language of nationalism. Women's interests were 
only represented in national terms, while at the same time women were kept mute. 
The old cliched saying is that women could not be liberated from colonialism if the 
nation is not. Women could only be free if the nation is first liberated from the 
influences of colonialism. As a result, the women's movement was marginalized. If 
one were to speak of women's interests without putting them into national context 
or referring first to the nation, would be considered irrational and anti-nationalistic. 
Clearly, the women's movement and promotion of women's interests could not 
develop out of the shadow of nationalist movements. Leaders of Indian women's 
movement, like their Ukrainian counter-parts, are skeptical about feminism as 
well. 
The term ''feminism" does come burdened with particular assumptions due to 
the circumstances under which feminism was produced. Therefore, when the 
Western feminists criticized the women's movement in the third world for being too 
conservative and too slow, women leaders of the Third World disapproved of such 
criticisms because of the hidden Western-centric assumptions of feminism and its 
misunderstanding of the situation in the third world. Chandra T. Mohanty criticizes 
the Western feminist discourse on third world women particularly on the 
application of ethnocentric notions and assumptions of the term ''Feminism",] She 
also insists that feminists from the third world ought to develop their own feminist 
ideas according to the circumstances. 
Interestingly, feminists and leaders of women organizations in Ukraine share 
the same view. As discussed earlier in this chapter, feminism was neither accepted 
63 Chandra Talpade Mohanty, "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial 
Discourses" in Chandra T. Mohanty, Ann Russo, Lourdes Torres (ed.). Third World Women 
and the Politics of Feminism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press) 1991, pp.51-80. 
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by most of the Ukrainian men nor by Ukrainian women. To date, feminism remains 
unpopular in the eyes of Ukrainians. Some women leaders have suggested that 
Ukraine should go the ''Ukrainian Way", that is to develop something called ''organic 
feminism" or��national feminism" instead of just��feminism" because the imposition 
of Western feminism would alien and incompatible with Ukrainian culture and 
c i r cumstances .64 The term feminism remains unconvincing to most women in 
Ukraine. Some women believe that being feminists would lose their femininity and 
attractiveness.^^ The mass media in Ukraine also disapproves of feminism. For 
example, the first issue of the so called first feminist magazine, Plata Pora [the Fifth 
Season] gave a mixed message of feminist and traditional imagery. On one hand, 
it contained an interview with Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, a prominent 
American feminist of Ukrainian heritage. Yet, on the other hand, there were 
depictions of traditional elderly women with a young girl, and with them, traditional 
embroidery and the national symbol of a trident. 66 The popular Ukrainian 
newspaper Den [Day] did a survey on gender issues in 1997. Interestingly, the 
article expressed that ''in the prevailing circumstances, a feminist movement just 
facilities the subordination of w o m e n " " 
VIII. Conclusion 
It is interesting to note that Berehynia appears in new, modern and 
64 For example, director of Gender Studies Center at the Academy of Sciences Nila 
Zborowska insisted that Ukraine should develop its own feminist idea. Quoted in Marian 
Rubchak, "Women's Issues in Ukraine. Past and Present" unpublished, pp. 3. Sincere thanks 
to the author. 
65 Solomea Pavlychio, "Progress on Hold: the Conservative Faces of Women in Ukraine", in 
Mary Buckley (ed.), Post-Soviet Women: from Baltic to Central Asia (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press) 1997, pp.231-223. 
66 Piata Pora, no. 1 (January 1993), pp. 1. See also Marian Rubchak,、、丁he Way We Were: 
Reconfiguring the Past to Reinvent the Present", unpublished, pp.6. Sincere thanks to the 
author. 
67 The Den, 14 October 1997. 
97 
contemporary form. A large statue of��Green" Berehynia stands in Lviv, the second 
largest city in Ukraine. Interestingly, the Den, one of the most popular newspapers 
in Ukraine, justifies this by claiming that because Lviv is a green city, that is why 
Berehynia is g r e e n . T h e old tradition is now in new and contemporary dress, so 
that she can remain fashionable and adapted to the new era. 
Berehynia is now a core part of the matriarchal tradition and the Ukrainian 
culture as well. The revival of Ukrainian tradition is a prioritized task in the nation 
building project. Currently, Ukrainian women are required to model themselves on 
Berehynia in order to help the nation. This modeling only confines women to 
motherhood and domesticity. Women respond to the cult of Berehynia positively, 
partly because of the poor situation in the job market where women are usually 
subject to discrimination at work, and are disadvantaged in getting jobs in the first 
place. Thus, some women may regard being mothers and staying home as 
desirable. Nevertheless, staying at home is impossible because a single income is 
not enough. Thus, women have to work, and they have also have to shoulder the 
responsibilities of nurturing their children and housework at the same time. 
Berehynia, therefore, only fosters and intensifies women's ''double burden". Some 
Ukrainian women even bear a ''triple burden". 
There are certain reasons for the government to promote the cult of Berehynia, 
including the risk of depopulation, low fertility, and the deteriorating economic 
situation. Ukrainian women are asked to sacrifice their own interests for the sake of 
the nation. 
Certainly, Ukraine is not the only country that requires women to work for the 
sake of the nation. Indeed, similar national discourses are found in some countries 
68 The Den, www.dav.kiev.ua/DIGEST/2001/31/sDOrt/spl.htm 
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that have experienced colonial rule. Male scholars and reformers in China in the 
late nineteenth century and early twentieth century urged women to ''enlighten'' 
themselves in order to bear and nurture better and stronger citizens. Women 
played a functional role in China's national movement. The Indian case illustrates 
how women's interests and issues are totally subsumed in the post-colonial nation 
building processes. Ukraine provides similar rhetoric and responses to the balance 
of nationalism and gender issues, and to feminism as well. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
I. Women's National Duties 
Three main themes are discussed and presented in this thesis. Firstly, nation 
building project requires different duties from women and men. For women, their 
national duties are typically confined to motherhood and domesticity. They are 
required to model themselves on the ancient pagan goddess Berehynia. For men, 
they are the nation builders, leaders of the Ukrainian government, and heads of 
families. 
Women are asked again to put aside their own interests for those of the nation. 
Certainly, this is not new; its historical roots can be traced back to the women's 
organized activities in Galicia in the nineteenth century when Ukrainian women 
were required to work for national liberation. The common ideology was that 
women could not be liberated if the nation was not first liberated. Today, Ukraine 
has gained its independence. Nevertheless, women are requested again to sacrifice 
personal interests for the sake of the nation. A liberated nation does not guarantee 
the liberation of women. 
Berehynia is also center to the Ukrainian matriarchal myth of the empowerment 
of women. The myth of the empowerment of women in Ukrainian pre-history has 
become the basis of the women's movement in Ukraine. Nonetheless, this 
matriarchal myth does not guarantee women a better future because the revival of 
the myth is selective. Women's reproductive function is revived. Women's leading 
roles are not. Thus, the second main theme, based upon the analyses of this 
matriarchal myth, shows the repudiation of the quest for women's rights and 
protections by claiming that Ukrainian women have been empowered since 
antiquity. Thus, further protections and rights would be redundant and 
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unn6C6SS3ry. 
Despite the efforts in pushing women back to domestic sphere, women must 
also work in order to earn money to support their families under the current 
deteriorating economic circumstances. Therefore, the third main theme discusses 
how the cult of Berehynia only intensifies and fosters women's "double burden" at 
home and at work. Some Ukrainian women even shoulder a "triple burden" when 
they have to find extra income by engaging in "shuttle business". 
The Ukrainian government wants its female citizens to model themselves on 
Berehynia for several reasons. The fall in fertility and the sharp decrease in the 
young population is leading to an overall decline in population and thus may affect 
Ukraine's long-term development. Thus, the government urges Ukrainian women 
to bear more children for the sake of the nation. The government also encourages 
women to tolerate the poor economic circumstances in periods of transition by 
promoting Berehynia's self-sacrificing nature. 
The model of Berehynia appeals to most Ukrainian women. She has become the 
role-model for many women. Many women hope to stay home and be ''happy 
housewives" partly because of the job market. Women are unemployed, underpaid, 
and some of them are abused at work places. Therefore, it is not uncommon that 
many Ukrainian women hope to stay at home and fulfill the role of Berehynia. 
Addressing women's issues is further complicated by the selective historical 
imagery of nation building. When Ukrainian male nation builders seek a role for 
women in nation building, nation builders look at the historical past for the sources 
of nation building, and there find the Cossacks. The Cossack experience provides a 
positive male tradition for the male nation builders. At the same, it also gives a 
negative tradition, because there was no place for women in the Cossack state. 
Furthermore, nation builders and reformers consider gender equality to be a 
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minor concern during the heroic period of nation building, state building and 
economic reform. Women's questions will be dealt only after the Ukrainian nation is 
built, various reforms are implemented successfully, and the state is constructed. 
Nonetheless, these projects and reforms do not address gender issues and 
women's issues. 
Women should enjoy the right to participate fully in both private and public 
spheres. It is the rights of citizens to engage in public activities, just as the 
Constitution of Ukraine guarantees. Democracy without the full participation of 
women is a contradiction in terms. Women's rights are also human rights and thus 
should be fully respected and protected. 
II.Suffering: Hope for a Better Future? 
It is interesting to compare the Asian economic miracle and the tremendous 
growth that the Soviet Union experienced in the 1950s. Paul Krugman believes that 
there was no Asian economic miracle. By comparing the growth in Asian countries 
and in the Soviet period, Krugman concludes that Asian people substituted present 
personal gains for future gains because the growth in both Asian countries and the 
Soviet Union was not marginal growth. In both cases, the present needs were 
sacrificed for the hope of a better future. Thus resources were re-invested in 
production instead of being consumed. ^ In other words, there was no 
real/marginal growth. For many Soviet people, they used to believe that if they 
worked, suffered and sacrificed in the present, it was for an idealized better future 
for their children, grandchildren and generations. Many Soviet people (particularly 
women) were eager to suffer because they believed that the next generation could 
1 Paul Krugman,、、丁he Myth of Asia's Miracle", Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, issue 6 
(November/December 94), pp.62- 78. 
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enjoy a better life.? Unfortunately, may of them were disillusioned. They suffered 
and sacrificed, but their children and their grandchildren did not enjoy a better life. 
However, could Ukrainians, after the fall of the Soviet Union, still be persuaded to 
bear present sufferings in hope for a better future for their children and 
grandchildren? 
Women are the big losers in transitional Ukraine. They are the first to lose their 
jobs and the last to get back to the job market. They are subject to abuses in the 
workplace, and subject to family violence too. Ironically, women are regarded as 
the ''provokers" in these cases. Home provides no refuge, the law no protection, 
and the public no sympathy for women. 
After all, the cult of Berehynia confines women to motherhood and domesticity, 
it repudiates further requests for women's rights and protection, and it also 
intensifies and fosters women's "double burden". If Western feminism can do 
nothing constructive for the Ukrainian women, neither can the cult of Berehynia. 
2 Catherine Wanner, The Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine 








Figure 1: A Ukrainian stamp showing the trident [tryzub] the Cossack 
symbol. It is also the national symbol. 
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Figure 2: A Ukrainian stamp issued in 1991 celebrating the 500^ ^ 
anniversary of the Zaporizhzhian Sich. 
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Figure 3: 5 Hryvna bill showing the portrait of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, the 
Cossack leaden 
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Figure 4: 10 Hryvna bill showing the portrait of Ivan Mazepa, the Cossack 
leader. 
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Figure 5: An embroidery design on shoulder of woman's shirt from Karhopil 
(Kargopol). According to the description of EJ. W. Barber, it shows three things. 
First, the center is the��Protectress" (Berehynia)(6eperHm) holding up birds and 
animals above her, a nd��a row o f��mothers� ( kirted women with arms bent 
down) beneath? (After Durasov and Jakovleva 1990, pp.47) 
Figure 6: One of the most common motifs used in Ukrainian embroideries. 
The motif represents fertility, mother/daughter relationship (mother on the top 
while the daughter is beneath).^ 
1 E.J.W. Barber ,��0n the Origins of vily/rusaiki". Varia on the Indo-European Past: Papers in 
Memory of Marija Gimbuta, Journal of Indo-European Studies, monograph 19 (1997), pp. 15� 
Also Marian J. Rubchuk, "In Search of a Model: Evolution of a Feminist Consciousness in 
Ukraine and Russia" in The European Journal of Women's Studies, vol.8, issue 2 (2000), 
p.149-152. 
2 Mary B. Kelly, "Living Textile Traditions of the Carpathians", in Linda Welters (ed.), Folk 






F igure 7: A g r a n d m o t h e r and her g r anddaugh te r d ress in ves ts bear ing a 
re in terpretat ion of t he anc i en t image of Berehynia.^ 
i K 
F igure 8: A Ukra in ian w o m a n dresses in t rad i t ional Ukra in ian folk c o s t u m e / 
3 Mary B. Kelly, "Living Textile Traditions of the Carpathians", in Linda Welters (ed.), Folk 
Dress in Europe and Anatolia: Beliefs about Protection and Fertility (Oxford: Berg) 1999, pp. 
165. 
4 Vasyl Skurativskyi, Berehynia (Kyiv: Radianskyi Pysmennyk) 1987, pp. 9. 
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Figure 9: The cover of Vasyl Skurativskyi's book. 
Figure 10: The gathering of three generations: grandmother, mother and 
granddaughters who are all making traditional handcrafts.^ 
5 Vasyl Skurativskyi, Berehynia (Kyiv: Radianskyi Pysmennyk) 1987, pp. 177. 
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Figure 11: A tapestry called��Berehynia" (1988) made by a male Ukrainian 
artist Stephan Hanzha.^ The tapestry reflects a modern reinterpretation of the 
image of the ancient goddess Berehynia. 
6 See http://www.artukraine.com/primitive/tapestrv.htm 
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